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PROFESSIONAL ETHICS IN 
INTERDISCIPLINARY COLLABORATIVES: 
ZEAL, PATERNALISM AND 
MANDATED REPORTING 
ALEXIS ANDERSON, LYNN BARENBERG & PAUL R. TREMBLAY* 
In this Article, the authors, two clinical law teachers and a social 
worker teaching in the clinic, wrestle with some persistent questions 
that arise in cross-professional, interdisciplinary law practice. In the 
past decade much writing has praised the benefits of interdisciplinary 
legal practice, but many sympathetic skeptics have worried about the 
ethical implications of lawyers working with nonlawyers, such as so-
cial workers and mental health professionals. Those worries include 
the difference in advocacy stances between lawyers and other helping 
professionals, and the mandated reporting requirements that apply to 
helping professionals but usually not to lawyers. This Article ad-
dresses those concerns in a direct way, using social work as an exem-
plar for many kinds of interdisciplinary practices. 
Part I of the Article explores the commitments of zeal and auton-
omy in interdisciplinary work involving lawyers and social workers. 
It acknowledges that social workers and lawyers receive differing 
training about advocacy stances, attention to the needs of the larger 
society, and concern for the best interests of clients, and therefore are 
apt to confront client interactions with dissimilar orientations. But 
the authors conclude that those differences in orientation in fact offer 
critical opportunities, when the professionals collaborate, for more 
effective lawyering, rather than posing a risk to a lawyer's or a social 
worker's ethical commitments. A lawyer and social worker team are 
likely to offer clients a richer brand of legal representation when 
working together than a lawyer working without the collaboration 
would provide. While some pointed ethical conflicts might arise, the 
authors contend that those conflicts are not unlike those faced by any 
reflective lawyer practicing without the benefit of collaboration. 
* Alexis Anderson is an Associate Clinical Professor of Law at Boston College Law 
School. Lynn Barenberg is a Lecturer in Law at Boston College Law School and the Staff 
Social Worker at the Boston College Legal Assistance Bureau. Paul Tremblay is a Clinical 
Professor of Law at Boston College Law School. The authors thank Dean John Garvey 
and the Law School Fund for generous support for this project, and Carol Liebman, Carlo 
Obligato, the participants at a workshop held at the Committee for Public Counsel Ser-
vices in Boston, and the participants at the UCLA/University of London Sixth Interna-
tional Clinical Conference at Lake Arrowhead, California for helpful comments on earlier 
versions of this Article. We also thank Albert Chan, Jeremy Eggleton, Meredith Duval, 
Mark Sullivan and Michael Yeung for their valuable research assistance. 
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Part II of the Article addresses the mandated reporter issue. 
When lawyers and social workers (or other helping professionals) 
collaborate, lawyers tend to be prohibited from reporting suspected 
child abuse and neglect if learned during a client's representation, 
while social workers tend to be mandated by state law to make a re-
port. The authors contend that when a social worker serves within a 
law firm or legal clinic as a consultant to· the legal team, the social 
worker ought not be covered by the state mandated reporting laws if 
the lawyers are not so covered. If the social worker, by contrast, pro-
vides social work services to the law firm's client, the state reporting 
laws will apply, and the collaboration must account for the resulting 
conflict in confidentiality duties. 
INTRODUCTION 
It is a rare legal problem that is in fact purely "legal." As much 
literature shows, nearly all disputes which end up among lawyers and 
courts involve complex emotional and interpersonal dynamics, 1 and 
most involve "industries" other than the law.2 To resolve those dis-
putes successfully, or even to "win" before a tribunal, a lawyer must 
use skills other than those traditionally taught in law schools. Or, per-
haps more likely, the lawyer must associate with persons who possess 
those skills. The benefits of an interdisciplinary law practice3 are be-
coming more and more apparent to lawyers and law teachers alike.4 
I See, e.g., Angela Burton, Cultivating Ethical, Socially Responsible Lawyer Judgment: 
Introducing the Multiple Lawyering Intelligences Paradigm Into the Clinical Setting, 11 
CuN. L. REv. 15, 24-25 (2004); Melissa Nelken, Negotiation and Analysis: If I'd Wanted to 
Learn About Feelings, I Wouldn't Have Gone to Law School, 46 J. LEGAL Eouc. 420, 427 
(1996); Erin Ryan, The Discourse Beneath: The Emotional Epistemology In Legal Deliber-
ation and Negotiation, 10 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 231, 238 (2005); Marjorie A. Silver, Emo-
tional Competence and the Lawyer's Journey, in THE AFFECTIVE AssiSTANCE OF CouNSEL: 
PRACTICING LAW AS A HEALING PROFESSION 5 (Marjorie A. Silver, ed., 2006) (hereinafter 
THE AFFECTIVE AssisTANCE oF CouNSEL]. 
2 See, e.g., DAVID A. BINDER, PAUL BERGMAN, SusAN PRICE & PAUL R. TREMBLAY, 
LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS 157, 159-61 (2d ed. 2004). 
3 For purposes of this article, we refer to the collaborative law practice about which we 
write, where a lawyer and a "helping professional," see infra note 5, work as a team to 
address the legal matters which the client has brought to the team, as interdisciplinary 
practice. We distinguish that phrase, for our purposes, from multidisciplinary practice, 
commonly known as "MDP," in which an institution, like a law firm, offers to its clients or 
customers more than one kind of direct service, like legal services and accounting services. 
In making this distinction we hope to keep separate the vast literature on MDP from the 
more narrow, and insufficiently explored, questions we attend to here. For a reference to 
some of the MDP literature, see infra note 9. 
4 See, e.g., Special Issue on Legal Representation of Children: Proceedings of the 
UNLV Conference on Representing Children in Families: Children's Advocacy and Justice 
Ten Years After Fordham, Recommendations of the UNLV Conference on Representing 
Children in Families: Child Advocacy and Justice Ten Years after Fordham, 6 NEv. L.J. 592, 
598 (2006) (supporting interdisciplinary legal services for children); Susan R. Jones, Pro-
moting Social and Economic Justice Through Interdisciplinary Work in Transactional Law, 
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While lawyers tend to be well trained to identify and address spe-
cific legal issues of concern to their clients, they often feel ill-equipped 
to work with the more challenging relationship issues presented in 
their work with clients. These challenges affect all aspects of the law-
yering process, including intake, interviewing, counseling, case plan-
ning, and legal .strategy decisionmaking. The ambition of 
interdisciplinary collaboration is to provide lawyers with information 
and skills that will help them to understand better and work more 
effectively with clients throughout the lawyering process. Because of 
their specialized training in human behavior, interpersonal dynamics, 
mental health assessment, psychosocial assessment, and systems the-
ory, social workers and similar "helping professionals"5 are able to 
help lawyers develop their practice knowledge and skills. The poten-
tial benefits of collaboration with other disciplines include more effec-
tive management of the lawyer-client relationship, more effective 
interviewing and counseling, increased likelihood of a successful out-
come for the client, increased client cooperation, increased efficiency, 
increased client satisfaction, enhanced client well-being, and reduced 
lawyer stress.6 
This Article explores some pointed ethical predicaments which 
14 WAsH. U. J.L. & PoL'Y 249 (2004) (small business transactions); Randye Retkin, Gary 
L. Stein & Barbara Rennie Draimin, Attorneys and Social Workers Collaborating in HIV 
Care: Breaking New Ground, 24 FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 533 (1997) (AIDS practice); Jacque-
line St. Joan, Building Bridges, Building Walls: Collaboration Between Lawyers and Social 
Workers In a Domestic Violence Clinic and Issues of Client Confidentiality, 7 CuN. L. REv. 
403 (2001) (domestic violence clinic); Annie G. Steinberg, Child-Centered, Vertically Struc-
tured, and Interdisciplinary: An Integrative Approach to Children's Policy, Practice, and 
Research, 40 FAM. Cr. REv. 116 (2002) (child-centered interdisciplinary practice); Pauline 
H. Tesler, Collaborative Family Law, 4 PEPP. DisP. REsoL. L.J. 317 (2004) (family law and 
divorce practice). 
5 In this article we use the term "helping professional," as it recurs in social science 
literature, to refer to those caregivers and counselors trained in the dynamics of human 
relationships. See, e.g., Chris A. Milne, The Vermont Lead Law-An Opportunity to Serve 
as a Helping Professional, 22 VT. B.J. & L. DIG. 17 (Dec. 1996) (distinguishing a "helping 
professional," concerned with a family as a whole from an advocate for a single member of 
a family). Cf DEBRA A. PooLE & MICHAEL E. LAMB, INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEWs oF 
CHILDREN: A GUIDE FOR HELPING PROFESSIONALS (1998). 
6 See, e.g., Joan S. Meier, Notes from the Underground: Integrating Psychological and 
Legal Perspectives on Domestic Violence in Theory and Practice, 21 HoFSTRA L. REv. 1295 
(1993) (describing collaboration with a psychologist); Claire Donohue, untitled paper 
(2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors) (analyzing the author's experiences 
at a multi-service community-based clinic offering both counseling and legal services); 
Maryann Zavez, The Ethical and Moral Considerations Presented by Lawyer/Social Worker 
Interdisciplinary Collaborations, 5 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADvoc. 191 (2005) (offer-
ing comments on experience practicing in an interdisciplinary family law clinic in Ver-
mont); Christina Zawisza & Adela Beckerman, Two Heads Are Better Than One: The 
Case-Based Rationale for Dual Disciplinary Teaching in Child Advocacy Clinics, 7 FL. 
CoASTAL L. REv. 631 (2006) (noting their experiences with interdisciplinary practice in 
children and family law matters). 
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arise in an interdisciplinary practice. The Article will focus specifi-
cally on two common ethical topics arising in the context of lawyers 
working with social workers, with the hope that the ideas included 
here will have implications beyond that collaboration. In law school 
clinic and poverty law settings, the lawyer/social worker collaboration 
is the most common variety of cross-disciplinary practice. The insights 
we discover from that setting ought to apply equally well to other 
common, even if less prevalent, cross-professional relationships, in-
cluding lawyers working with doctors, nurses, psychologists, and simi-
lar helping professionals.? Our treatment here will not address some 
other equally interesting and challenging questions arising from mul-
tidisciplinary practice (MDP) in the business world, such as collabora-
tion between lawyers and other professionals such as accountants, 
public relations specialists, financial planners, and title insurers.8 
Those topics, perhaps because of their sheer financial importance, 
have received substantial attention within ethics scholarship.9 Our 
questions, by contrast, have begun to attract scholarly attention, but 
substantially less thus far than the corporate MDP questions.10 
This article seeks to further the ongoing work of scholars of col-
laborative practice by honing in on two questions, the first general in 
scope and the second more discrete, which remain the subject of some 
7 As we shall see below, see text accompanying notes 40 and 54 infra, some of our 
analyses of competing ethical responsibilities rely on the specific legal and professional 
obligations of social work, as the profession we chose to explore. To the extent that we 
have engaged in such profession-specific analysis, our conclusions may not be inevitably 
applicable to a different helping profession. That acknowledgement notwithstanding, we 
expect that the general suggestions and conclusions we offer here will have much relevance 
to collaboration between lawyers and any other helping professional. 
8 See, e.g., the intra-firm entity established by the Boston law firm of Mintz, Levin, 
Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C., known as ML Strategies, LLC, and described at 
http://www.mlstrategies.com (last visited Feb. 18, 2007). For a general analysis of different 
models for organization of legal entities involved in MDP, see J. Michael Norwood & Alan 
Patterson, Problem-Solving in a Multidisciplinary Environment? Must Ethics Get in the 
Way of Holistic Services?, 9 CuN. L. REv. 337 (2002). 
9 See, e.g., Stacy L. Brustin, Legal Services Provision Through Multidisciplinary Prac-
tice: Encouraging Holistic Advocacy While Protecting Ethical Interests, 73 U. CoLo. L. 
REv. 787 (2002); Mary C. Daly, Choosing Wise Men Wisely: The Risks and Rewards of 
Purchasing Legal Services from Lawyers in a Multidisciplinary Partnership, 13 GEo. J. LE-
GAL ETHICS 217 (2000); Bryant G. Garth, "From the Trenches and Towers": MDPs after 
Enron/Andersen, Multidisciplinary Practice after Enron: Eliminating a Competitor but not 
the Competition, 29 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 591 (2004); George C. Nnona, Situating Multidis-. 
ciplinary Practice Within Social History: A Systemic Analysis of Inter-Professional Competi-
tion, 80 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 849 (2006). 
to We will find that some of the insights generated by the conventional MDP debates 
inform our discussion here. For instance, a significant worry within the MDP debate arises 
from the different ethical roles and duties of nonlawyer professionals and lawyers, and 
whether client interests will suffer as a result. See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., SusAN P. 
KONIAK, RoGER C. CRAMTON & GEORGE M. CoHEN, THE LAw AND ETHICS OF LAw-
YERING 1120-21 (4th ed. 2005). 
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uncertainty in the literature and the doctrine. Those questions are as 
follows: 
1) The Perceived Tensions Between the Lawyer's Zeal or Client Au-
tonomy Commitments and the Social Worker's Attention to 
Broader Interests: The first, broader inquiry of this Article ex-
plores a common understanding-or perhaps misunderstand-
ing-of the effect of a lawyer/social worker collaboration. For 
some this understanding is a worry; for others, an opportunity. 
The basic idea is that a lawyer working with a social worker will 
adjust her role responsibilities away from the typical unfettered 
zeal and commitment to client autonomy that her legal training 
has taught her. Social workers attend to a larger "moral commu-
nity" and to social justice concerns;11 lawyers attend to the 
wishes of their clients. Surely, the argument goes, these two ori-
entations must clash, and perhaps in ways which challenge a law-
yer's ability to comply with her Rules-driven obligations, and 
which challenge the social worker's commitment to broader soci-
etal interests. We hope to understand this perceived tension, to 
assess its validity, and to compare carefully the rules governing 
lawyers' work with the messages offered by (and the rules and 
laws governing) the collaborating social workers. 
2) The Mandated Reporter Question: The second topic of this Arti-
cle is, seemingly, the most challenging analytical problem faced 
by non-lawyer professionals working within a law firm, or in con-
junction with a lawyer. The question is simple, but its answer 
profoundly important: Is a professional who is otherwise man-
dated when acting in his professional role to report abuse to a 
state agency subject to that same command when consulting or 
collaborating with a lawyer? We will address that question di-
rectly and offer as clear an answer to it as the available doctrine 
and our imagination permit. 
Part I of this Article will address the first of those two topics, 
II See CoDE OF ETHICS OF THE NATIONAL AssociATION OF SoCIAL WoRKERS, availa-
ble at http://www.socialworkers.org/pubs/code/code.asp (last visited February 10, 2007) 
[hereinafter SociAL WoRKER CoDE]. While the NASW Code of Ethics is not binding on 
social workers directly (much like the ABA's Model Rules are not binding on lawyers until 
adopted by a state), the Code's provisions often serve as the basis for licensing regulations 
in a state. See, e.g., ILL. ADMIN. CoDE tit. 68, § 1470.96(2) (2007)(defining "unethical, 
unauthorized, or unprofessional conduct" of social workers); Ohio Counselor, Social 
Worker & Marriage and Family Therapist Board Laws and Rules §B(4) ("the board sub-
scribes to codes of ethics and practice standards for ... social workers ... promulgated by 
the ... National Association of Social Workers [among other associations], which shall be 
used as aids in resolving ambiguities which may arise in the interpretation of the rules of 
professional ethics and conduct"). The Code also captures the sentiments conveyed by 
social work training and philosophy. See Lisa A. Stanger, Conflicts Between Attorneys and 
Social Workers Representing Children in Delinquency Proceedings, 65 FoRDHAM L. REv. 
1123, 1140-48 (1996) (describing the influence and teaching of the NASW Code of Ethics). 
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after a preliminary exploration of the differences, as well as the com-
monality, between the role expectations of the two professions. Part I 
concludes that collaboration between lawyers and social workers is 
likely to encourage richer and more robust legal representation on 
behalf of the clients served by the collaboration. Part II then ad-
dresses the mandated reporter issue. It concludes that, while author-
ity is sparse at best, in certain settings the most reasonable 
construction of the reach of the appropriate obligations would hold 
that a social worker employed by a law firm is not bound by a report-
ing requirement. In other settings, especially those in which the social 
worker provides services directly to the lawyer's client, the most plau-
sible construction is that the reporting duty survives, notwithstanding 
the legal ethics rules. 
I. RoLE TENSIONs IN LAw-SociAL WoRK PRACTICE 
A. The Perceived Lawyer/Social Worker Divide 
A broad concern arising from interdisciplinary practice is the po-
tential for a clash of professional orientations. From the lawyer's per-
spective, it appears possible, and perhaps even likely, that an attorney 
working in tandem with a social worker will tend to offer legal ser-
vices which are less zealous than those offered by a "solo" lawyer, 
because social workers see disputes and problems with a more inclu-
sive perspective, and care more about a broader audience, than do 
lawyers. It also seems possible, and perhaps even likely, that the law-
yer collaborating with a social worker, and influenced by the social 
worker's best interests-focused orientation, will tend to be more pa-
ternalistic than the "solo" lawyer. Were these predictions true, per-
haps a collaborating lawyer would need to obtain some explicit 
informed consent from her client to this different, less client-centered 
representation.12 And, from the social worker's viewpoint, the legal 
collaboration could well produce analogous professional dilemmas 
were he to join the client's legal team as a consultant. We explore 
these worries in this part. We conclude that they are ultimately un-
founded, although not without some substance. While lawyers and 
social workers may initially approach their work from different start-
ing points, we maintain that any fear of irreconcilable professional 
12 While there is no explicit mandate that requires attorneys to embrace client-centered 
representation, see Robert D. Dinerstein, Client-Centered Counseling: Reappraisal andRe-
finement, 32 ARIZ. L. REv. 501, 534 (1990), it is clear that attorneys must abide by clients' 
lawful decisions. See MoDEL RuLES OF PRoF'L CoNDucr R. 1.2 (2003) [hereinafter 
MoDEL RULEs]. Thus, to the extent a collaborating lawyer might be less zealous, a client's 
decisionmaking could be adversely affected. As discussed more fully below in Section I.B., 
we conclude that this concern is ultimately unpersuasive. 
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conflict is overblown. Instead, the collaboration between the two pro-
fessions offers the client the potential for an enhanced exploration of 
the client's goals and options during a comprehensive legal counseling 
session undertaken before the lawyers embark on their zealous advo-
cacy with third parties. 
Before turning to our analysis of the effect of interdisciplinary 
collaboration on the ethical duties lawyers owe their clients, it is im-
portant first to test the common assumption that the two professions' 
perspectives are fundamentally at odds. Were social workers and law-
yers to be fully allied in their cultures and professional mandates, then 
any ethical concerns would disappear. Despite some shared profes-
sional values, social workers and lawyers do enter professional collab-
oration with different ethical mandates and distinct orientations to 
their roles in working on behalf of clients, and it is these differences 
that are potential sources of interdisciplinary tension. 
Let us begin by acknowledging some shared fundamental values 
as reflected in the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct and the 
Social Worker Code of Ethics. Both lawyers and social workers iden-
tify as helping professionals. Both serve as counselors, advisors and 
advocates for their clients. Both attempt to facilitate conflict resolu-
tion, while respecting client self-determination and confidentiality. In 
addition, both strive to uphold fundamental societal values and pro-
mote public service.13 These values are at the core of each profes-
sion's orientation to practice. 
As important as it is to acknowledge the values shared by lawyers 
and social workers, it is equally important to appreciate certain funda-
mental differences in their professional cultures and their approaches 
to advocacy and problem-solving. Some of these distinctions reflect 
contrasting objectives of the professional intervention; others reflect 
differences in training and professional orientation. Both perspectives 
have much to offer to the process of advocating on behalf of clients. 
While any shorthand summary risks obscuring the complexities of 
each profession's work, we have found the following chart useful as an 
introductory contrast of the two professional orientations to advo-
cacy.l4 But it is the professions' contrasting trainings and perspectives 
13 See MoDEL RuLES, supra note 12, Preamble, R. 1.2, 1.6, and 2.1; SociAL WoRKER 
CoDE, supra note 11, Ethical Standards 1.01, 1.02, 1.07. See also Jane Aiken & Stephen 
Wizner, Law as Social Work, 11 WASH. U. J. L. & PoL'Y 63 (2003). 
14 We realize that the chart could mask the nuanced work of individual professionals. 
For example, a good lawyer will concern herself with client well-being and the impact of 
the case on third parties. She will also be a problem-solver to advance her client's inter-
ests. A good social worker will have an interest in protecting his client's legal rights and 
autonomy. While recognizing its limitations, the chart, we believe, is a useful shorthand 
description of the different trainings and orientations of the two disciplines. 
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that produce potential tensions in practice. Recognizing that no one 
list can capture the complexities of professional life, we offer this di-
chotomy to suggest the different points of view each specialist brings 
to the table. 
Law 
Adversarial process I 
Litigation 
Zealous advocacy for stated 
interest 
Protect legal rights 
Protection of individual rights 
Address legal problem 
Analytic (break whole into 
parts) 
Focus on outcome 
Value professional autonomy 
Social Work 
Cooperative process I Problem 
solving 
Safeguard best interest 
Enhance client well-being 
Consideration of third parties 
and community 
Address underlying cause of 
problem 
Synthetic (put parts together 
to assess whole) 
Focus on process 
Value professional 
collaboration 
For those lawyers who might be considering interdisciplinary col-
laboration with social workers, a number of professional responsibility 
concerns arise. These include: the perceived tension between the law-
yer's duty to represent the client's stated interest zealously and the 
social worker's duty to enhance the client's best interest and well-be-
ing, 15 the concern that consideration of the social work perspective 
will increase lawyer paternalism and inhibit client autonomy, and the 
worry that legal counseling will become legal "therapy." In addition 
to these specific concerns, interdisciplinary collaboration often raises 
concerns about potential role and goal confusion. 
We are not the first to discuss the challenges posed by interdisci-
plinary collaboration between social workers and lawyers. As Jean 
Koh Peters described her experiences with social worker/attorney 
partnerships, "due to the distinct ethical mandates of the two profes-
sions[ ] legal and social work practitioners must expect conflict and 
15 See, e.g., Jean Koh Peters, Concrete Strategies for Managing Ethically-Based Con-
flicts Between Children's Lawyers and Consulting Social Workers Who Serve the Same Cli-
ent, 1 KY. CHILD. RTs. J. 15 (1991); St. Joan, supra note 4. Surveys of professional 
attitudes have shown that social workers and lawyers may need to build bridges toward 
greater understanding. See, e.g., James L. Scherrer, How Social Workers Help Lawyers, 21 
SociAL WoRK 279 (1976) (noting conflicting professional attitudes which could undermine 
successful attorney/social worker teamwork); Franklin B. Fogelson, How Social Workers 
Perceive Lawyers, 51 SociAL CASEWORK 95 (1970) (survey of social workers suggested 
distrust of lawyers which would adversely affect interdisciplinary collaboration). 
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tension in cooperating to represent a common client."16 Paula 
Galowitz confirmed those concerns in her review of interdisciplinary 
collaboration in legal services practice: "There is an inherent tension 
between a lawyer's and a social worker's ethical responsibilities. The 
lawyer's responsibility is to advocate zealously for the client's wishes, 
while the social worker's is to safeguard the client's best interests."17 
More recently, Kate Kruse reached a similar conclusion: "[T]he pater-
nalism that the social work ethic entails remains in tension with the 
deference to client autonomy inherent in the zealous advocate's con-
struction of what it means to act in a client's interest."18 While each 
commentator proceeds to suggest protocols designed to resolve such 
tensions, their analyses are bottomed on the presumption that ethical 
conflicts must be expected in interdisciplinary practice.19 
Our starting point is somewhat different. Rather than presume 
ethical tensions, we seek to explore those underlying assumptions. 
While we grant that social workers and lawyers join forces with dis-
tinct professional orientations, it is our experience that these differ-
ences do not interfere with effective lawyering as might be expected, 
but in fact serve to enhance lawyering. Ethical questions do arise, but 
when carefully scrutinized, those ethical issues prove not to be irrec-
oncilable conflicts. Indeed, as developed below,2° these questions are 
not qualitatively different from the ethical dilemmas faced by an at-
torney practicing without the benefit of another professional's 
wisdom. 
With mutual understanding of one another's professional respon-
sibilities, clearly stated role expectations, express administrative poli-
16 Peters, supra note 15. 
17 Paula Galowitz, Collaboration Between Lawyers and Social Workers: Re-Examining 
the Nature and Potential of the Relationship, 67 FoRDHAM L. REv. 2123, 2140 (1999). 
18 Katherine R. Kruse, Lawyers Should Be Lawyers, But What Does That Mean?: A 
Response to Aiken & Wizner and Smith, 14 WASH. U. J. L. & PoL'Y 49, 76 (2004). Kruse's 
article offers important insights on the apparently competing views of professional role 
held by lawyers and social workers. Her analysis attempted a reconciliation of the views 
expressed in two articles presented at a conference held at Washington University School 
of Law in March 2003, entitled "Promoting Justice Through Interdisciplinary Teaching, 
Practice, and Scholarship." The first article, by Jane Aiken and Stephen Wizner, chal-
lenged lawyers to think and act more like social workers. Aiken & Wizner, supra note 13. 
The second, by Abbe Smith, offered a contrary view based on criminal defense practice 
experience. Abbe Smith, The Difference in Criminal Defense and the Difference It Makes, 
11 WAsH. U. J. L. & PoL'Y 83 (2003). 
19 See also Joan L. O'Sullivan, Susan P. Leviton, Deborah J. Weimer, Stanley S. Herr, 
Douglas L. Colbert, Jerome E. Deise, Andrew P. Reese & Michael A. Millemann, Ethical 
Decisionmaking and Ethics Instruction in Clinical Law Practice, 3 CuN. L. REv. 109, 170 
(1996) (describing teaching clinic with a social worker, and noting "the professions' con-
flicting ethical obligations"); Stanger, supra note 11, at 1143 ("[s]ocial workers' roles are 
inherently different from those of lawyers"). 
20 See text accompanying notes 41-44, 72-75 infra. 
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cies and protocols, and effective communication, the team members 
can overcome the perceived tensions and anticipated concerns about 
interdisciplinary practice. We have found that both clients and the 
interdisciplinary practitioners benefit from the collaboration, making 
the investment in the process well worth the candle.21 
In an effective interdisciplinary practice, it is expected that the 
lawyer will maintain her role as zealous advocate, advocating for the 
client's stated interests, and protecting the client's individual rights 
and legal interests, but the process and "professional conversation" 
will be qualitatively different from the process and dialogue of tradi-
tional lawyering practice. The lawyer will maintain her role as legal 
counselor, not therapist; she will "work with" the client's emotional 
concerns to provide effective legal representation, not "work through" 
them in the therapeutic sense. The social worker's role will be defined 
by the particular model of interdisciplinary practice being employed-
social worker as direct service provider (counselor, therapist, social 
service/case management provider), social worker as expert consult-
ant, or social worker as member of the legal team. The social worker 
will understand that, although the scope of the lawyer's counseling 
may be more comprehensive with social worker input, the lawyer's 
role is ultimately to represent her client's stated interest. Thus, when 
entering into collaborative practice, it is the responsibility of both the 
lawyer and social worker to clarify practice models, define role expec-
tations, and identify potential professional responsibility concerns. 
We now turn to two distinct ethical worries arising in interdiscipli-
nary practice-those of possibly diminished zeal and possibly exces-
sive paternalism. 
B. The "Zeal" Worry 
A hallmark of attorney-client relationships is the lawyer's duty to 
represent her clients zealously. Lord Brougham captured the stan-
dard years ago in his classic entreaty to his profession: "An advocate, 
in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in all the world, 
and that person is his client. "22 Modern supporters of partisan advo-
21 In this article, we do not presume to review the important field of therapeutic juris-
prudence which seeks, among other things, to address the potentially adverse conse-
quences to litigants' mental health and well-being occasioned by the legal system. See, e.g., 
AFFECTIVE AssiSTANCE OF CouNSEL, supra note 1; DAVID WEXLER, THERAPEUTIC JuRIS-
PRUDENCE: THE LAW AS A THERAPEUTIC AGENT (1990). However, advocates of that ap-
proach have long extolled the benefits of interdisciplinary collaboration. 
22 TRIAL OF QUEEN CAROLINE 8 (J. Nightingale ed., 1820-21), quoted in DEBORAH 
RHODE & DAviD LuBAN, LEGAL ETHics 137 (4th ed. 2004). It should be noted that Lord 
Brougham offered these remarks in the midst of contentious and politically charged, high 
stakes litigation. His Queen's head was literally on the line. Whether he would have de-
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cacy defend their approach as instrumental in protecting client auton-
omy and in nurturing client loyalty and trust.23 
Not surprisingly, professional rules governing lawyers have incor-
porated mandates related to lawyer zeal. For example, the Model 
Code of Professional Responsibility promulgated in 1969 included a 
specific directive on "Representing a Client Zealously."24 Then, in 
1983 the Model Rules of Professional Conduct ("Model Rules"), 
which serve as the framework for the disciplinary rules in the vast 
majority of jurisdictions, required lawyers to advocate for clients' 
goals, though arguably in a somewhat more muted fashion than earlier 
codes. 
Model Rule 1.2 currently provides as follows: "A lawyer shall 
abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of representa-
tion .... "25 Subject to the lawyer's companion duty of candor toward 
tribunals,26 attorneys retain special duties within our adversarial sys-
tem to press for their clients' goals.27 Litigators are their clients' 
champions in the good fight to obtain the clients' desired outcomes.28 
scribed the role of an attorney as counselor the same as litigator has been frequently de-
bated. See Deborah L. Rhode, An Adversarial Exchange on Adversarial Ethics, 41 J. 
LEGAL EDuc. 29 (1991). 
23 For a recent review of the literature on the values inherent in client-centered repre-
sentation, see Katherine R. Kruse, Fortress in the Sand: The Plural Values of Client-Cen-
tered Representation, 12 CuN. L. REv. 369 (2006). 
24 See MoDEL CoDE oF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITY, DR 7-101 [hereinafter 
MoDEL CoDE] (providing that "[a] lawyer shall not intentionally fail to seek the lawful 
objectives of his client through reasonably available means permitted by law and the Disci-
plinary Rules, except as provided by DR 7-101 (B) ... "). See also AMERICAN LAw INSTI-
TUTE, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §16 (2001) (hereinafter 
RESTATEMENT] ("a lawyer must, in matters within the scope of the representation ... 
proceed in a manner reasonably calculated to advance a client's lawful objectives, as de-
fined by the client after consultation .... "). 
25 Note that Model Rule 1.2 (c) allows a lawyer to limit client objectives if the client's 
informed consent is obtained. MoDEL RuLEs, supra note 12, R. 1.2(c). 
26 /d. at R. 3.3. 
27 See also id. at Preamble ("As advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the client's posi-
tion under the rules of the adversary system."). The Comment to Rule 1.3 describes the 
duty of zeal: "A lawyer must also act with commitment and dedication to the interests of 
the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf." /d. at R. 1.3, Cmt. [1 ]. 
28 Particularly in the criminal defense context, some commentators have gone one step 
further and argued that the lawyer's role must be narrowly defined to focus on the rights 
and needs of the lawyers' client, to the exclusion of the larger community. See generally, 
Smith, supra note 18. Quite recently, advocates of zeal have found their view of the pro-
fessional role of the criminal defense bar challenged. Compare Monroe Freedman, In 
Praise of Overzealous Representation-Lying to Judges, Deceiving Third Parties, and Other 
Ethical Conduct, 34 HoFSTRA L. REv. 771 (2006) and Anita Bernstein, The Zeal Shortage, 
34 HoFSTRA L. REv. 1165 (2006) with Fred Zacharias & Bruce Green, Reconceptualizing 
Advocacy Ethics, 74 GEo. L. REv. 1 (2005). Prof. Freedman suggests that Lord 
Brougham's conception of zeal is still the fundamental lawyering obligation. See Monroe 
Freedman, Henry Lord Brougham and Zeal, 34 HoFSTRA L. REv. 1319, 1319 (2006) (re-
sponding to Zacharias and Green). 
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Contrast the attorneys' professional role with that of social work-
ers, who are ethically obligated to pursue their clients' best interests 
and are more attentive to the needs of others around the client. As 
provided in the National Association of Social Workers' Code of Eth-
ics,29 the professional charge of social workers is to: 
enhance human well-being and help meet the basic human needs of 
all people .... A defining feature of social work is the profession's 
focus on individual well-being in a social context and the well-being 
of society.30 
Furthermore, social workers bear the responsibility of weighing their 
duties to the "larger society" against their clients' interests.31 Indeed 
the social workers' code is clear that their duties to others may trump 
their duties to promote the well-being of their clients: "Social workers 
may limit clients' right to self-determination when, in the social work-
ers' professional judgment, clients' actions or potential actions pose a 
serious, foreseeable, and imminent risk to themselves or others."32 
Similarly, the existing literature on interdisciplinary collaboration 
generally presumes that ethical tensions will arise when social workers 
and lawyers join forces to represent a client. Professionals from both 
camps describe ethical concerns as inherent in interdisciplinary 
practice.33 
Given the conflicting missions and professional dictates of attor-
neys and social workers, is legal collaboration likely to produce seri-
ous ethical tensions that undermine the collaborative project? While 
instances of joint delivery of services by both professionals raise the 
most challenging ethical tensions, even those interdisciplinary issues 
are not insurmountable. We need to start with a clear understanding 
of the role each member of the team is being asked to play. Once 
those duties are determined, then we can scrutinize their conduct to 
determine if ethical breaches are likely to occur. We conclude that 
clear definition of professional role and intra-team communication 
29 While the Social Worker Code is not in itself binding law, state professional licensure 
rules provide the basis for legal sanction. For additional discussion, see supra note 11. 
30 See SociAL WoRKER CooE, supra note 11, at Preamble. See also text accompanying 
note 14 supra. 
31 /d. at 1.01 ("Commitment to Clients"). 
32 /d. at 1.02 ("Self-Determination"). 
33 See generally Peters, supra note 15, at 24 (noting that "inter-ethical tensions that 
many children's lawyers and their consulting social workers experience in working together 
for their clients are both inherent and manageable"); Galowitz, supra note 17. See also 
Jose Ashford, Mary Wirtz Macht & Melissa Mylym, Advocacy by Social Workers in the 
Public Defender's Office, 32 SociAL WoRK 199, 202 (1987) (noting inherent difficulties in 
interdisciplinary collaboration if the competing views of the lawyer's "advocacy" role and 
the social worker's "best interest" approach are not resolved and suggesting that changes 
to the Social Worker Code may be required lest the social worker be relegated to a role 
tantamount to that of a secretary to the legal team). 
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will help ensure ethical conduct and effective representation by all 
professionals. 
As in most clinical discussions, context is critical. Therefore, we 
offer the following scenario built off a clinic case we handled. That 
our examples involve law school clinics should not be surprising. As 
clinical teachers, we write most readily about our own work and our 
experiences in a storefront, civil legal services clinic engaged in pov-
erty law practice.34 We have also chosen to ground our discussions in 
our clinical work because much of the interdisciplinary collaboration 
that exists today occurs in those university settings and our audience is 
most likely to experience these issues in that context. However, the 
clinical setting is not central to our analysis. 
******* 
Jane was a feisty mother who came to the clinic seeking a divorce 
from her husband, John, of fifteen years. Jane had devoted her life to 
her family, particularly her two sons, having abandoned her career in 
the nursing field to put her children first. She was also a survivor: Jane 
wanted to ensure that her contributions were recognized and valued, 
something John had been loath to acknowledge over the years. John 
was a local firefighter, well-respected in the community and an ac-
tively involved father who coached their boys' Little League teams. It 
was clear to both parties that their marital relationship was over; years 
ago, both parties had alleged that the other was abusive and mutual 
restraining orders had been obtained, which had since expired. Rec-
onciliation efforts were unsuccessful, and it was unclear which party 
would file first for divorce. 
While no one doubted that Jane was a caring mother, Jane 
seemed ambivalent about seeking custody of the boys. She recog-
nized that the boys were close, that they both had good relationships 
with their father, and that she was often overcome by the responsibili-
ties of caring for teenage boys. Jane, however, was anything but am-
bivalent about her feelings toward John. The clinic team found that 
she became obstinate and abrasive whenever she sensed that John 
might have the upper hand in any aspect of the divorce proceeding. 
Initially, Jane sought and won temporary custody orders over the 
parties' two sons, Albert fourteen, and Jeremy thirteen, despite the 
fact that both boys expressed a preference to be with their father. 
Jane's efforts to maintain the family home and thus stable schooling 
34 The authors practice at the Boston College Legal Assistance Bureau ("LAB"), a 
non-profit organization founded some 40 years ago to offer legal services to the surround-
ing community. Since the 1970s, a licensed independent clinical social worker has been on 
staff and served as a consultant to the legal team. 
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arrangements for the boys initially persuaded the judge to grant her 
physical custody. She shared joint legal custody with John, who ob-
tained very liberal visitation rights. Once school closed for the sum-
mer, though, the boys voted with their feet and essentially moved in 
with their father. 
As the time of the final divorce hearing approached, Jane's am-
bivalence resurfaced. She acknowledged being relieved at being freed 
of childcare responsibilities; however, she did not want to concede any 
ground to John. So, Jane suddenly adopted a new goal, which she 
acknowledged was motivated partly by spite: she asked the clinic team 
to help her maintain custody of just Jeremy. The team observed her 
actively trying to undermine the relationship between Jeremy and his 
father and between Jeremy and his brother. She began trying to bribe 
Jeremy's affections with gifts and preferential treatment. And, by her 
actions and words, Jane did her best to alienate the elder son. She was 
mean-spirited to Albert, cementing his desire to stay with John. Her 
instructions to her legal team were clear: "I want to keep Jeremy; his 
father can have Albert." John and his counsel argued for custody of 
both boys and marshaled significant evidence from teachers, neigh-
bors, etc. that it was in the boys' best interests to stay together and 
with their father.3s 
******* 
Let us assume that an interdisciplinary team comprised of a stu-
dent lawyer, supervising attorney, and a consultant social worker has 
offered to represent Jane in her divorce. As they introduce them-
selves to Jane at the initial intake meeting, they explain their distinct 
roles. The team will be led by the clinic student and her supervising 
attorney; the social worker will not offer direct counseling services to 
the client, but rather will confer with the legal team as a consultant. 
Initially, Jane's goals are clear and unquestionably lawful; she has a 
legal right to divorce John given the irretrievable breakdown of their 
marriage. No ethical rubs so far. 
If we fast forward, however, to the later chapters of the represen-
tation, we find that Jane's goals have become more complex. The di-
vorce risks being stalled over a messy custody battle if Jane persists in 
her more recently announced goal of winning custody of Jeremy. Fur-
thermore, the legal team has begun to question Jane's motives in 
claiming custody of Jeremy. When pressed during a counseling ses-
35 We recognize that the Court would likely appoint a guardian ad litem (GAL) to 
represent the interests of the minor boys. However, for simplicity's sake, we have nar-
rowed the cast of characters since we do not believe the presence of a GAL would change 
our analysis of this scenario. 
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sion, Jane has acknowledged that her new objective is motivated in 
part by revenge toward John. 
At this juncture, let us pause and reassess the ethical duties of the 
interdisciplinary legal team. At first blush, one could envision an un-
workable tension. On the one hand, a parent facing the loss of cus-
tody of her child is entitled to all the zeal her attorney can muster.36 
On the other, the social worker would be obligated to attend to the 
family's best interests post-divorce and would likely have real con-
cerns about separating the boys. 
Here is where skeptics who question the feasibility of interdisci-
plinary collaboration would call a halt to the teamwork or, at a mini-
mum, raise serious questions about its efficacy. The doubters will 
foresee an irreconcilable clash of professional rules and culture that 
would interfere with the attorneys' duty to provide the zealous repre-
sentation that Jane deserves. Since Jane's goal of obtaining custody of 
Jeremy is lawful,37 her lawyers could champion her cause, unfettered 
by concerns about the impact of the lawyer's arguments on the boys' 
relationship to each other or Jeremy's connection with his father. 
And, they might argue, the lawyers certainly do not need one of their 
own firm members working to undermine their efforts by raising ques-
tions about the family's welfare.38 Thus, a skeptic might conclude ei-
ther that the collaboration is inimical to the most effective 
representation of Jane, or that the team ought to obtain Jane's in-
formed consent, after adequate consultation, to this hobbled 
representation.39 
Our assessment, bolstered by our own experiences with interdis-
ciplinary collaborations, leads us to question the worriers' premises. 
36 While a parent has no constitutional right to representation in a custody dispute, 
some have argued that the interests at stake are so fundamental as to require zealous rep-
resentation akin to criminal defense. Lassiter v. Dep't of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18 
(1981) (ultimately holding that no right to representation exists). For views on the zeal 
required in criminal representation, see generally Smith, supra note 18. See also The Ed-
ward V. Sparer Symposium on Civil Gideon: Creating a Constitutional Right to Counsel in 
the Civil Context, 15 TEMP. PoL & Ov. RTs. L. REv. 557 (2006). 
37 See MoDEL RuLES, supra note 12, R. 3.1 (prohibiting lawyers from bringing a frivo-
lous claim); id. at Cmt. [2] ("The action is frivolous, however, if the client desires to have 
the action taken primarily for the purpose of harassing or maliciously injuring a person."). 
38 It should be noted that this description of attorney conduct assumes that a model of 
zealous representation presents a sharp contrast with the best interests approach of the 
social work profession. However, some commentators have urged lawyers to consider 
their responsibility to local moral communities in lieu of a model of pure client loyalty. 
See, e.g., Thomas Shaffer, Towering Figures, Enigmas, and Responsive Communities in 
American Legal Ethics, 51 ME. L. REv. 229 (1999). 
39 The critics might compare the collaborative team representation to a lawyer operat-
ing under a potential conflict of interests, which would require an informed waiver by the 
client before the representation could proceed. See MoDEL RuLES, supra note 12, R. 
1.7(b). 
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If we analyze the perceived ethical rubs more closely, it is less appar-
ent that an intra-team conflict would undermine the collaboration. In-
deed, we believe that a reflective lawyer, operating without the 
benefit of collaboration with another professional, would likely recog-
nize many of the same concerns that the team's social worker has flag-
ged and navigate them successfully. Therefore, while challenging, the 
professional questions which arise in this case are not unique to inter-
disciplinary collaboration, but may be attended to more thoughtfully 
and effectively with the benefit of the collaborative process. 
At the outset, however, we acknowledge that the skeptics have 
correctly defined the two disciplines' professional duties. We presume 
that the social worker on the legal team will be attentive to how all the 
family members will be affected by the divorce.40 Jane's new goal of 
wresting custody of Jeremy from his dad will likely be of concern, es-
pecially if independent evidence and the social worker's own clinical 
assessment support a contrary decision. Therefore we should assume 
that the social worker will resist-or at least question-Jane's spiteful 
efforts to grab Jeremy from his father. 
Similarly, during the court proceedings, we acknowledge that 
most conventional role definitions would say that Jane's lawyers must 
zealously advocate with John's counsel and with the judge for Jeremy 
to stay with mom. Our clinical team would be ethically bound to put 
John (and any witnesses testifying on his behalf) to the test when his 
attorney tries to prove that Jeremy should stay with his father. 
We acknowledge that the legal team is ethically bound to be 
Jane's zealous champion in court. However, we do not believe that 
the interdisciplinary collaboration is fatally hobbled because the 
team's ultimate duty is zealous representation. Rather, we contend 
that the profound changes to the texture and nature of the team's rep-
resentation of Jane would occur at the pre-hearing stage before the 
partisan advocacy with third parties begins. Specifically we invite 
closer scrutiny of the legal team's counseling with Jane and of the dia-
logue that would likely occur between the professionals in preparation 
for the counseling session itself. What would the lawyers and social 
worker be saying about their different perspectives within team meet-
ings and with Jane? As developed below, we believe that the crux of 
the interdisciplinary collaboration would happen in those intra-team 
meetings and would foster the richer, more nuanced client interac-
tions that are the hallmark of good lawyering. 
If asked in the privacy of their office, it is hard to imagine that the 
lawyers would not admit some significant reservations with Jane's new 
40 See SociAL WoRKER CooE, supra note 11, § 1.01 (noting social workers' "responsi-
bility to the larger society"). 
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goal. They know that Jeremy's expressed preference is to stay with 
John; they have heard Jane admit that she has mixed motives in pursu-
ing custody. These concerns will be further validated when they hear 
from the social worker on the team. 
We find, as we explore this meeting, that the position the lawyers 
find themselves in is in fact no different from the position of any 
thoughtful "solo" lawyer faced with Jane's case.41 What must (or can) 
these lawyers do when faced with their own internal struggles and dif-
fering perspectives within the interdisciplinary team?42 First, a law-
yer's duty of zealous representation is not without limits. In addition 
to her duty not to assist with illegality or frivolous claims,43 counsel's 
obligations to clients are tempered in other ways. Under Model Rule 
1.2 (c), Jane's lawyers have the right to seek her consent to limiting 
her objectives.44 Thus, if the legal team is so distressed by her request 
for custody of Jeremy, the team members can counsel her about their 
reservations. It is this pre-trial process that deserves further scrutiny. 
In preparing for such a client meeting, the team would undoubt-
edly convene to plan for the event. We can assume that any ethical 
rubs would surface in those discussions. The social worker might de-
tail his concerns about Jane's plans for Jeremy, including the follow-
ing: 1) the boys have a close bond; 2) John has demonstrated an ability 
to care appropriately for his teenage sons; 3) all the men profess 
strong desires to remain a family unit; and 4) Jane's sudden interest in 
custody of Jeremy is prompted in large part by her malice toward 
John. But it strains credulity to believe that only the social worker has 
identified these issues. Surely the lawyers will also have realized that 
any case plan will have to account for such adverse evidence. 
The intra-team meeting would not conclude with a perfunctory 
recitation of the mounting evidence that is at odds with Jane's pro-
fessed goal. Instead, let us look further at the interdisciplinary dia-
logue. The social worker might well urge the team to use the 
41 A paradigm ethical dilemma about which many have written involves the tensions a 
lawyer faces when her client elects to make what she perceives to be a "bad" choice. See 
generally Stephen EHmann, The Ethic of Care as an Ethic for Lawyers, 81 GEo. L. REv. 
2665 (1993); Warren Lehman, The Pursuit of a Client's Interest, 77 MicH. L. REv. 1078 
(1978-79). 
42 We have defined this collaboration as being chaired by the lawyers, with the social 
worker acting as a consultant. Under Model Rule 5.3, it is clear that the lawyer must 
ensure that the conduct of a non-lawyer assistant (i.e., the social worker) is compatible 
with the attorneys' professional duties. See MODEL RuLES, supra note 12, R. 5.3. There-
fore, our analysis presumes that it is the lawyer who must regulate the interdisciplinary 
team's conduct to ensure that no breach of legal ethics occurs. 
43 See supra text accompanying note 37. 
44 See also MoDEL RULES, supra note 12, R. 1.3, Cmt. [1) ("a lawyer is not bound to 
press for every advantage that might be realized for a client"). 
676 CLINICAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:659 
upcoming meeting to explore with Jane the consequences of her pro-
fessed goal. For example, what effect does she think her decision will 
have on the boys' relationship to each other and to her? He might ask 
the team to acknowledge the anger that Jane apparently feels toward 
John and to then inquire whether there are other ways to hold John 
accountable for his conduct that has pained Jane. Thus the social 
worker would redefine the team's focus from Jane's narrow stated in-
terests to the larger questions of the long term needs and goals of all 
family members, including Jane herself. If Jeremy's stated desire of 
staying with his dad is in his best interests, and in the best interests of 
his brother, then the social worker would advocate at the interdiscipli-
nary team meeting for a qualitatively different counseling session with 
Jane.45 The social worker might provide a fuller assessment of the 
client's emotional landscape, a fuller exploration of the client's inter-
ests (both stated and unstated), a broader understanding of the legal 
"facts" that might be affecting the lawyering process, and suggestions 
for more nuanced communication with the client to elicit facts and 
facilitate decisionmaking. 
If the interdisciplinary collaboration is to be embraced, the law-
yers will seek to incorporate the social worker's insights, rather than 
ignore them. But how, given that his concerns run counter to Jane's 
professed goal? At the team's preparatory meeting, the members 
could develop strategies for counseling Jane about their concerns. 
Nothing in the Model Rules precludes attorneys from sharing reserva-
tions with their clients. Indeed Rule 2.1 expressly condones such 
counseling: 
In representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent profes-
sional judgment and render candid advice. In rendering advice, a 
lawyer may refer not only to law but to other considerations such as 
moral, economic, social and political factors, that may be relevant to 
the client's situation.46 
Therefore, in its role as advisor/counselor to Jane, the legal team has 
every right to share its concerns about her professed goal.47 And any 
lawyer who neglected to address these concerns with Jane would, it 
45 The social worker may well conclude also that the best interests of Jane coincide with 
the boys staying together, lest a "victory" in this custody battle prove purely Pyrrhic. We 
treat that question as a conceptually separate one-a question of paternalism rather than 
of concern for third parties-and we return to it in Part II.C. below. 
46 MooEL RuLES, supra note 12, R. 2.1. See also id. at R. 1.2(a) (requiring attorneys to 
consult with clients as to the means by which their goals are to be pursued). 
47 While there is no rule which requires attorneys to counsel clients about any concerns 
the legal team has, we submit that good practice supports that view. As pointed out ear-
lier, some commentators, especially when discussing the duties of the criminal defense bar, 
might question such a departure from zealous representation. See note 28, supra. 
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seems to us, be an ineffective lawyer. 
In addition, any standard of good lawyering demands that Jane be 
counseled on the likely outcome of her custody battle.48 Here, there 
is independent, contrary evidence which the judge will consider in 
reaching a decision on Jeremy's custody. It is the team's duty to assess 
the strength of all the testimony and evidence that will likely be intro-
duced on the contested issue and to advise Jane about her likelihood 
of success. Whether Jane's resolve would change after being updated 
on the anticipated legal outcome is unclear; the point is that it could 
influence her decisionmaking and she should be fully informed of all 
of the implications of her choices. 
Which leads to another wrinkle in this representation. Were the 
team to conclude that Jane's motivation is purely revenge, the lawyers 
would need to cease representing her in this spiteful mission. Pursu-
ant to Model Rule 4.4, lawyers are forbidden from using means "that 
have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden 
a third person .... "49 Here, if the lawyers were to learn from Jane that 
the custody goal is purely a ruse to harass John, they would need to 
advise Jane that they could not advocate the custody matter on her 
behalf. 5° 
With these ethical parameters clarified, the team can then pro-
ceed to discuss the process by which the members can counsel Jane 
about the looming custody battle. Here the training and expertise of 
the social worker can be invaluable to the lawyers. How can the team 
package its information in a way that would optimize the likelihood 
that Jane could hear and comprehend it? Should the team ask Jane to 
reverify her goals, and, if so, how? What options can the team gener-
ate for Jane's consideration? 
At the conclusion of the counseling session, Jane will make a 
choice. Perhaps she will elect to drop the custody fight if convinced 
that she is likely to lose and after having been advised of the potential 
consequences, both to her and to her family, of pursuing the custody 
fight. But, for purposes of our analysis, we have to assume that Jane 
will persist. If so, what must the team do? We contend that Jane's 
interests in zealous representation now trump the team's concerns.51 
48 See generally MoDEL RuLES, supra note 12, R. 1.4 (obligating lawyers to keep clients 
appropriately informed about their case's status and to "explain a matter to the extent 
reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the 
representation"). 
49 !d. at R. 4.4(a). 
50 See id. at Preamble ("A lawyer should use the law's procedures only for legitimate 
purposes and not to harass or intimidate others"). 
51 It is possible that the conflict between the team and Jane is so profound as to prompt 
the team to withdraw its services. See id. at R. 1.16. However, it is unlikely that the court 
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Assuming that Jane does not seek custody of Jeremy principally to 
harass John,52 the lawyers now must champion her cause, however ill-
advised it may be. Jane may well lose, but her interests and the law-
yers' duty of loyalty require that she go down swinging with good law-
yers by her side. 
But what, then, of our social worker's dilemma? Assuming (as is 
likely) that he continues to believe that Jeremy's best interests are to 
be in his dad's custody even after the counseling session, are we sug-
gesting that he breaches his own professional duties by remaining part 
of the clinic team? We believe not, for two reasons. First, remember 
the construct of the interdisciplinary team. We defined the team from 
the beginning as a legal team in which the social worker is acting as a 
consultant. Therefore, under Model Rule 5.3, it is the lawyer who 
must ultimately bear the burden of defining the ethical path. The so-
cial worker is thus shielded from sanction within his profession be-
cause of his specially defined role in this engagement. But second, we 
are not persuaded that the social worker has otherwise breached his 
professional duties, even if he could not rely on the lawyers' rules as a 
defense. As we have described it, he has performed his social worker 
role as he ought to have done. He has cared for Jane and her family; 
he has sought to engender a holistic solution which minimizes harm to 
all involved. We can assume that he has done so with insight and com-
passion. The fact that Jane, who is not his client,53 has opted to pro-
ceed in a way that the social worker may not prefer does not imply 
that he has failed in his role responsibilities.54 
C. The "Paternalism" Worry 
So far we have been concerned with whether lawyers leading an 
interdisciplinary team can provide sufficiently zealous representation 
to their clients. We have been intentionally outwardly focused as we 
would agree to the withdrawal on the eve of trial. Furthermore, for our analysis, with-
drawal moots the conflict. Therefore we have assumed that the representation would 
continue. 
52 See supra text accompanying note 37 regarding prohibitions against pursuing means 
designed purely to harass a third party. 
53 Our discussions have assumed that the social worker is not providing direct services 
to his client, but rather serving as a consultant to the lawyers who represent their client, 
Jane. See text accompanying note 35 supra. 
54 The Social Worker Code lists respect for the "Dignity and Worth of the Person" as a 
core value and urges social workers to "promote clients' socially responsible self-determi-
nation." See SociAL WoRKER ConE, supra note 11, "Ethical Principles." Here, where we 
have envisioned opportunities to counsel Jane on the consequences of her goal and to 
probe her rationales for seeking Jeremy's custody, we believe that the social worker will 
have complied with the dictates of his profession. See also id., Ethical Standard 1.01 
("Commitment to Clients: Social workers' primary responsibility is to promote the well-
being of clients. In general clients' interests are primary."). 
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investigated whether lawyers would soft peddle their advocacy as a 
result of being exposed to social workers' perspectives. Using the ex-
ample of representation of a client whose objectives the team ques-
tions, we have explored the potential harm which could result to 
innocent third parties. While we have concluded that ethical concerns 
surrounding the duty of zeal can be overcome and are akin to those 
faced regularly by solo practitioners, our analysis would be incomplete 
if we did not also address the intra-team conflicts which might arise 
were the professionals to fail to respect their clients' autonomy in a 
different way by responding paternalistically. 
In this section, we propose to look inward. The prior section 
chronicled the interdisciplinary consultations that would maximize the 
ability of Jane's lawyering team to advocate zealously for her express 
desires. We now shift the focus and investigate whether lawyers in-
volved in an interdisciplinary collaboration will be more likely to treat 
their clients paternalistically. The concern can be simply stated: if the 
professional mandate of social workers is, at least in part, to attend to 
their clients' best interests,55 will the lawyer members of the interdisci-
plinary team be so tainted by this perspective as to be unable to re-
spect sufficiently their clients' decisionmaking? 
Again, a case example drawn from our practice will help illumi-
nate this ethical puzzle. 
******* 
An active sixteen-year-old with a winning smile, Rob was a sports 
star whose skills ranged from football to basketball. While no one 
doubted his athletic ability, his educational achievements were se-
verely limited. Rob tried hard, but his school records showed a failing 
student with significant delays in reading, math and written expres-
sion. His mother had requested special education services for her son 
while he was still in elementary school. The minimal progress that he 
had accomplished with special services in the lower grades soon evap-
orated as Rob entered the public, neighborhood high school. Inde-
pendent testing confirmed that he had a severe language-based 
learning disability and profound attention deficit/hyperactivity disor-
der ("ADHD"). The combination of those limitations often contrib-
uted to Rob's frequent violation of school rules. The pattern became 
all too predictable: Rob would have difficulty understanding the les-
sons, lose concentration, be reprimanded for being disruptive, and fail 
another class. 
55 See text accompanying note 14, supra, regarding the ethical obligations of social 
workers. 
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Given the severity of his ADHD, Rob's mother sought advice 
from his pediatrician, who referred Rob to a pediatric neurologist for 
a pharmacological assessment. Over the next several years, Rob tried 
a range of ADHD prescribed medications with little evident success. 
Many carried side effects which worried the family (including a per-
ceived concern that his growth was being stunted). And, even when 
medicated for ADHD, Rob did not see any measurable improvement 
in his educational progress. Therefore, at age fourteen and under 
medical supervision, Rob stopped taking any ADHD medications. 
In desperation, the family contacted the local law school clinic 
with an interdisciplinary focus, which agreed to represent him56 in his 
efforts to find an appropriate out-of-district school placement. After 
much investigation, an alternative high school with a comprehensive 
therapeutic approach agreed to accept Rob. But, all too quickly, Rob 
risked more failure. His new special education trained teachers re-
ported that his ADHD was so severely compromising Rob's ability to 
learn that he could not be promoted and that high school graduation 
was unlikely; an independent neuropsychological evaluation con-
firmed that his ADHD was pervasive and warranted treatment. Fur-
ther medical assessment and academic testing also recommended 
ADHD medication. 
Throughout the lawyering team's work with Rob, he remained 
steadfast in his two goals: to get an education and to stay off medica-
tions. "I've tried all their pills and I just get more jumpy. I'm not 
putting any more stuff in my body." Rob's neurologist acknowledged 
that individual patient experiences with ADHD medications are quite 
varied; while some do report a decrease in symptoms with certain 
medications, others find little, if any, improved functioning. Further, 
he indicated that it is not unusual for it to take a few trials and errors 
to identify the medication that is optimum for any given patient. 
Therefore, he believed it was possible, though not guaranteed, that 
Rob could find significant relief were he to agree to try another 
ADHD medication. Rob, supported by his mother, declined any fur-
ther medical interventions. However, as school progress continued to 
prove elusive, his mother grew increasingly frustrated. She knew she 
56 In our example, Rob is a high school teenager with very clear goals. He had been 
making significant decisions regarding his medical care and had specific objectives for his 
education. Therefore we have assumed that the lawyering team might well define Rob as 
the client, even though his mother would still need to be consulted in educational decision-
making in the special education process. See 20 U.S.C. §1414 (d) (1)(B) (defining the 
members of the "individualized education program team" to include the parents of the 
child with a disability and the child "whenever appropriate"). This question is compli-
cated, and special education practitioners take different approaches to the question of 
whether the client is the parent or the child. 
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could not force her teenage son to accept the medications; long gone 
were the days in which she could overpower him. But she kept hop-
ing, perhaps unrealistically, that some miracle cure could be found in 
time to help her son succeed. 
While Rob's lawyers, in consultation with the clinic's social 
worker, did obtain an out of district placement in a specialized pro-
gram designed for students with learning and behavioral disabilities, 
school success continued to elude Rob. At the end of his first term in 
the new school, his new special education teachers reported that they 
had never seen a student with such difficulty attending to task even 
where the class program had been modified in length and structure to 
accommodate Rob and other classmates with special needs. Rob 
risked failing two core subjects for the year, which would put in jeop-
ardy his promotion to the 11th grade. In an effort to forestall another 
school failure, the legal team requested that Rob's individualized edu-
cation program team ("IEP Team") reconvene to assess Rob's lack of 
progress. 
******* 
As in the zeal case study involving Jane,57 we assume that, when 
the interdisciplinary legal team comprised of a student lawyer, super-
vising attorney, and a consultant social worker offered to represent 
Rob in his efforts to obtain a more appropriate educational program 
tailored to his special needs, each member advised Rob of her/his re-
spective role. We trust that the legal team members described their 
particular responsibilities clearly to Rob at the intake meeting (and 
later to his mother58), expressly clarifying that the social worker would 
not be offering direct counseling services to Rob, but would instead be 
a consultant to the legal team.s9 
The initial work of the legal team would have proceeded rela-
tively uneventfully for our purposes. Together the legal team mem-
bers helped the family identify possible alternative school placements, 
while the lawyers advocated zealously with the school district that an 
57 See supra Part I. B. 
58 We will assume that any conversation with Rob's mother took place only after the 
lawyer/social worker team had obtained Rob's informed consent to discuss his case with 
her. See MoDEL RuLES, supra note 12, R. 1.6(a). 
59 Many commentators have identified the beneficial role which social worker consul-
tants can play in special education cases. Lawyers can learn much from their social worker 
colleagues in the areas of deciphering educational testing, interviewing and counseling of 
minors, and building constructive working relationships with members of the educational 
IEP Team assembled to craft an Individualized Educational Plan ("IEP"). See Peters, 
supra note 15; see also Kristen Henning, Loyalty, Paternalism and Rights: Client Counseling 
Theory and the Role of the Child's Counsel in Delinquency Cases (2005) (unpublished man-
uscript, on file with authors). 
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out of district placement was required to meet Rob's significant learn-
ing needs. Given that Rob supported the transfer to a new school and 
his failures in the existing program were so well documented, the law-
yers and social worker consultant were united in their objective of 
assisting Rob to obtain a new school placement. 
But that cozy alliance risks ethical conflict when Rob is admitted 
to a new program and the old cycle of educational failure recurs. Dur-
ing the preparation for the upcoming IEP Team meeting, members of 
the interdisciplinary legal team begin to voice different perspectives 
on Rob's needs and goals. Given Rob's goal of succeeding in school, 
the social worker consultant points to significant evidence that Rob 
should be counseled on the option of another medication trial. Inde-
pendent evaluations have recommended treatment for his ADHD; 
medical professionals have supported a new psychopharmacological 
assessment; and his current teachers attribute his educational failure 
largely to his inability to attend to task. He would alert Rob's lawyers 
that Rob's overall functioning, including academic progress, could im-
prove were he to consent to another medication assessment and this 
would potentially address Rob's goal of graduating. 
If, as developed above, Rob's lawyers are fulfilling their role of 
zealous advocacy, then their goals for the IEP Team meeting should 
be clear. Rob does not want to recommence ADHD medication; 
therefore his lawyers should respect Rob's stated interests unless this 
case falls into some exception to the normal attorney-client relation-
ship. Some may argue that Rob's youth provides just such an excep-
tion. Indeed many jurisdictions have redefined the traditional 
lawyering role when an attorney is representing a minor.60 
Lawyers' professional mandates contain provisions which place 
special duties on lawyers representing minors. Model Rule 1.14 rec-
ognizes that, on occasion, children's lawyers may need to take protec-
tive actions on behalf of a minor like Rob, which would be arguably at 
odds with zealous advocacy: 
When the lawyer reasonably believes that the client has diminished 
capacity, is at risk of substantial physical, financial or other harm 
unless action is taken and cannot adequately act in the client's own 
interest, the lawyer may take reasonably necessary protective ac-
tion, including consulting with individuals or entities that have the 
ability to take action to protect the client .... 61 
60 See Peters, supra n. 15, at n. 20-21. 
61 MODEL RULES, supra note 12, R. 1.14(a). See a/so RESTATEMENT, supra note 24, 
§24 (outlining a similar view: "When a client's capacity to make adequately considered 
decisions in connection with the representation is diminished, ... because of minority ... 
the lawyer must, as far as reasonably possible, maintain a normal client-lawyer relationship 
with the client and act in the best interests of the client as stated in Subsection (2)"). 
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If Rob's lawyers were to conclude that he is at risk of substantial 
harm, then they could choose to honor their sense of his best interests 
over his stated desire to avoid medication.62 
Under that permutation, no ethical rift in Rob's interdisciplinary 
team would occur. All members of the legal team would share a com-
mon goal of helping Rob succeed in school. They would agree to con-
front Rob with the evidence in support of further medical 
intervention, and do their best to persuade him to reconsider another 
psychopharmacological consult. If Rob changed his mind, and de-
cided to accept another medication assessment, then so much the bet-
ter. If Rob remained unalterably opposed to medication, then the 
legal team would either withdraw or betray its client's wishes.63 
But reliance on the special ethical rules applicable to children 
makes our analysis too easy. Any lawyer, even one representing a 
minor, has an ethical duty to attempt to maintain as normal a lawyer-
client relationship as possible.64 Not only do legal ethics require 
Rob's attorneys to normalize the professional relationship to the ex-
tent possible regardless of his minority status,65 but Rob is also nearly 
an adult. By the age of 16, Rob has a voice in his medical care. In-
deed some jurisdictions recognize that sixteen year olds have the right 
to refuse medical treatment.66 Here, we know that Rob not only does 
not want to be medicated, but also will reject any efforts by his mother 
to force the issue. 
If we proceed on the assumption that Rob is not an impaired cli-
ent, but rather a youth who can participate fully in the lawyer-client 
relationship, the· possible ethical tension within the interdisciplinary 
62 See also MoDEL RuLES, supra note 12, R. 1.14, Cmt. [1] ("When the client is a minor 
... , however, maintaining the ordinary client-lawyer relationship may not be possible in all 
respects"). 
63 Under Model Rule 1.16(b), counsel has discretion to withdraw if "withdrawal can be 
accomplished without material adverse effect on the interests of the client" or if "the client 
insists upon taking action that the lawyer considers repugnant or with which the lawyer has 
a fundamental disagreement. ... " ld. at R.1.16(b). In the alternative, one could posit a 
mandatory withdrawal scenario on these facts given that Rob might decide to fire counsel 
that proposed he accept ADHD medication. See id. at R. 1.16 (a)(3). 
There is clearly a practical limit on attorney betrayal in our scenario. No one could 
force Rob at his age to take medication if he steadfastly refused. However, one could 
envision more subtle forms of attorney coercion, such as enlisting the help of his mother 
and his pediatrician to "encourage" Rob to accept another trial of ADHD medication. 
64 See id. at R. 1.14 (a). 
65 See id. at R. 1.14 (a) and Cmt. [1] ("children as young as five or six years of age, and 
certainly those of ten or twelve, are regarded as having opinions that are entitled to weight 
in legal proceedings concerning their custody"). 
66 See generally Baird v. Attorney General, 371 Mass. 741 (1977)(reviewing the mature 
minor rules as adopted in other jurisdictions); see also Arthur Murphy & Geoffrey 
Wermuth, The Right to Decline Medical Treatment in Massachusetts, 76 MAss. L. REv. 131, 
142 (1991). 
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team becomes much clearer. We can assume that the social worker's 
position would remain focused on h~lping Rob resolve his apparently 
conflicting goals. On the one hand, Rob has said he wants to succeed 
in school; on the other, he rejects a medical option that could facilitate 
that success. The social worker on the team would conclude that 
Rob's best interests would be served by counseling him about the op-
tion of medical intervention to curb the adverse effects of his severe 
ADHD. Let us further assume that the lawyers decline to treat Rob 
as a client of diminished capacity. Instead the lawyers opt to respect 
Rob's express goal of rejecting medication due to his status as a ma-
ture youth and his wish that he have an advocate for that position at 
the upcoming IEP Team meeting. In this variation of our story, skep-
tics of interdisciplinary practice would fear that Rob's legal team 
would face an intra-team ethical dilemma. 
Can the team members' distinct professional cultures and rules be 
harmonized consistent with their respective obligations to Rob and, if 
so, how? For this analysis, we need to detail the intra-team discus-
sions that would ensue behind closed doors. We can envision an intra-
team meeting convened to plan for the upcoming IEP Team meeting. 
The lawyers would state their intent to represent Rob's interests zeal-
ously by confirming that, if Rob so instructs them, they will resist any 
suggestions by third parties to force another medical assessment. On 
that score, the social worker would have no ethical qualms. As the 
team advised Rob at the outset, Rob is entitled to zealous representa-
tion undiminished by the interdisciplinary collaboration.67 
Next, the legal team would consider how to counsel Rob on his 
choices and how to clarify his apparently conflicting goals. Undoubt-
edly, the social worker would note that absent medical intervention, 
the accomplishment of Rob's other stated goal of succeeding in school 
was in jeopardy. A litany of evidence supports his view. By all ac-
counts, Rob's performance at the new placement is being undermined 
by his uncontrolled ADHD. Therefore, the consultant might urge the 
lawyers to counsel their client about the various professionals' opin-
ions about medication and explain that, if he were to find an appropri-
ate medication, he would likely find relief from some of his symptoms. 
How would the lawyers respond? On our facts the social worker 
consultant has accurately relayed the medical evidence which is at 
odds with one of Rob's stated goals-avoiding medication. Further-
more, we must assume that the lawyers are reluctant to ignore their 
consultant's professional opinion. The social worker is their col-
league; they have willingly joined an interdisciplinary team for the ex-
67 See supra Part I. B. 
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press purpose of eliciting insights from other professional quarters. To 
reject peremptorily their consultant's findings is directly to reject their 
client's interests and, indirectly, to reject interdisciplinary practice. 
Instead, we should assume that the social worker's presentation 
has sorely tested the lawyers' resolve to plow forward at the IEP Team 
meeting with Rob's stated goal of no medication. Not only must the 
lawyers acknowledge the significant amount of expert evidence which 
contradicts Rob's objective of rejecting medication, but they would 
likely admit personal reservations about the propriety of a student 
risking his education when a medical intervention could possibly 
break the cycle of school failure. Especially here, where Rob's com-
panion goal of getting an education is at risk, the lawyers would be 
tempted to betray Rob's medication position in order to maximize the 
likelihood that he would graduate. 
Should the intra-team meeting adjourn with that result, the legal 
team will counsel Rob with its agenda front and center rather than 
Rob's. The counseling session would become a forum for persuading 
Rob that his rejection of medication is wrong-headed. In this scena-
rio, the team members hope that they can persuade Rob into agreeing 
to another medication assessment. If successful, Rob will have lost his 
champion at the upcoming IEP Team meeting. Rob's lawyers will no 
longer be representing their client zealously; rather they will have suc-
cumbed to paternalism and risked betraying their client. As we have 
discussed above, in reviewing the dictates of Model Rule 1.16,68 either 
they will recognize their duty to withdraw or they will be fired. 
But let us propose a different, arguably more realistic, counseling 
scenario. If the team members acknowledge their concern with Rob's 
stated anti-medication goal, they owe a duty to Rob to discuss their 
reservations with him.69 The process by which the legal team informs 
Rob of its concerns is key. In advance of that session, the legal team, 
including the social worker, would need to meet to plan the upcoming 
counseling session. 
The more nuanced intra-team discussions might involve social 
work consultation on a number of issues related to process, as well as 
content. The social worker might share with the legal team specific 
information about Rob's ADHD and learning disabilities and how 
they might affect the counseling/decisionmaking process-both how 
68 See supra text accompanying note 51. 
69 The lawyer's professional duty to counsel Rob is found in her duty to keep her client 
apprised of case developments and her duty to advocate for her client's goals. See MoDEL 
RuLEs, supra note 12, R. 1.2(a) and R. 1.4. Similarly, the social worker's ethical code 
requires him to advise his client of likely outcomes. See SociAL WoRKER CoDE, supra 
note 11. 
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Rob is able to take in information and how the lawyers might present 
information most effectively. There may be special considerations 
with respect to the complexity of sentence structure, language, pacing 
and organization of information. The social worker could also pro-
vide some insight into developmental and emotional issues that might 
affect communications with an adolescent-the importance of being 
heard and respected, of feeling in control, of not feeling "different." 
The social worker could also suggest how the legal team might elicit 
and more fully explore Rob's underlying interests, as well as suggest 
how to respond more fully to Rob's emotional concerns. 
After an intra-team consultation with the social worker, a more 
effective counseling session with Rob might proceed like this:70 
Student lawyer: Rob, we want you to know that we are here to 
represent you and what you want to happen at this point. You've 
mentioned two things that are important to you. One, you want 
to do well in school and graduate with your class, and two, you do 
not want to consider getting back on medication. Are we right 
about that? 
Rob: Uh huh. 
Student lawyer: As we've told you before, it will ultimately be 
your decision whether or not to take medicine for your ADHD. 
It is your body, your decision, and no one can physically force 
you to take medication. We understand that you had been on a 
number of medications in the past and some had some pretty sig-
nificant side effects. A few of them made you feel jumpy and "out 
of it" and one in particular affected your growth. Were there any 
other particular concerns you had about medication? 
Rob: I don't like feeling that I might need to depend on medica-
tion for the rest of my life. It's a hassle. It makes me feel like I 
can't handle myself-like I'm weak. 
Student lawyer: With respect to the ADHD medication, would it 
make a difference to you if it was not a lifetime commitment? 
We could get information about that if it would be helpful to you. 
And when you say "It's a hassle" -are you thinking of anything 
in particular? 
70 While this dialogue presumes that only the clinic student and client participated, we 
certainly encourage legal teams to include their social worker colleagues directly in client 
meetings to the extent that time and resources allow. We include this two-party dialogue 
to allow our readers to sample the more nuanced, process-conscious, client-centered dis-
cussion that can occur when the lawyer's approach is informed by the social work 
perspective. 
Spring 2007) Interdisciplinary Collaborations 687 
(Assume here that Rob describes some "hassles" with the 
medication and his lawyer addresses them directly.] 
It's not unusual for people to feel that way about medication, and 
it's not an easy decision. If you had a medical problem and there 
was medicine that would help ease the symptoms or the pain, 
would that seem "weak"? It might help us to understand how 
you think of this as different. 
(The lawyer might then empathize with the added challenges 
of having to live with a special medical/learning problem; 
then there may be some discussion of ADHD as a medical/ 
neurological condition-not something Rob can control fully 
or "will away" hard as he may try.] 
You have some good reasons to think hard about whether taking 
medication makes sense for you at this point-how it makes you 
feel about yourself, the hassle and the side-effects. 
As you know, Dr. Choi, the neurologist at Children's Hospital, 
Dr. Brodnosky, the school psychologist, and Dr. Hull, your pedia-
trician, have all said that they think that medication would very 
likely help with the problems you've been having at school, al-
though there are no absolute guarantees. And here is why we 
bring it up-because we know you have said how much you want 
to do better at school so you can graduate with your class. 
If you decide not to consider medication, do you see any other 
ways of getting the help you need to do better in school? 
Rob: If the teachers would just get off my back and out of my 
face I could do the work. 
(The social worker consultant might recognize that Rob is in 
part externalizing the problem and minimizing the effect of 
his ADHD.] 
Student lawyer: I can certainly talk to your teachers about the 
importance of working with you in a way that respects your 
space. Realistically, we can't control fully how teachers respond 
to students and situations in their classrooms. But can you tell 
me what is most important to you about how your teachers work 
with you? 
(Rob responds with some details; the student lawyer ac-
knowledges and they plan on how to talk to his teachers.] 
Student lawyer: I know how much you want to believe that if you 
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just try hard enough, you'll be able to manage school. I worry 
that you put too much pressure on yourself. After all these years, 
you've had to deal with the fact that no matter how hard you try, 
the ADHD sometimes gets in the way. You have learned some 
very helpful ways of dealing with it, but it never goes away. 
So before we talk to the IEP Team, we want to be sure we under-
stand what you want us to say. We know that you want both-no 
medication and a good school experience. 
Unfortunately, realistically, it may be one or the other. 
We can tell them that you don't want to consider taking the medi-
cation-even if that means that you will likely continue to have 
difficulty in school and may not be able to graduate with your 
class. So the decision comes down to this-neither option gets 
you everything you would like. By staying off medication, you 
will avoid the concerns you have about the medication, but you 
will likely continue having problems at school. By taking medica-
tion you may improve your chances of graduating with your class, 
but you will need to deal with the concerns you have about the 
medication. 
It's not an easy decision. 
Rob: Yep. 
Student lawyer: I want to be honest with you-I would hate to 
see you have a tough time with school. 
You are bright and talented and I know how much it means to 
you to graduate on time. I worry that if you don't consider the 
medication you may lose a critical window of opportunity to 
change things around for yourself. At the same time, I respect 
that you are the one who has to live with the medicine. This 
would be a tough decision for an adult, and you are just 16. But 
you are old enough for us to respect your decision. 
So what are you thinking? Is there anything we can do to help 
with the decision? 
Faced with the adverse evidence and the internal inconsistency of 
his goals, Rob might grudgingly agree to medication. He also might 
not budge. Should the latter be the case, the lawyers' duty is clear. 
Our reasoning at this juncture replays that described in the scenario 
involving Jane.71 At the next IEP Team meeting, the lawyers' profes-
71 See supra Part LB. 
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sional duty is to advocate zealously for Rob's lawful goal. While the 
lawyers may have lingering doubts over the propriety of Rob's deci-
sion (and their role in enabling that course of action), they will know 
that the team did its best to apprise Rob of the risks. Rob will likely 
not be the first client, nor the last, to reach a decision that carries with 
it significant risks. 
What of the professional obligations of the lawyers' social work 
colleague? He has conducted himself ethically. His duty to advise 
Rob of the potential adverse consequences of his decision and of an 
alternative course of action has been satisfied. The social worker's 
insights have enriched the counseling session with Rob by ensuring a 
more comprehensive discussion, including the risks and benefits of 
Rob's chosen path. But the consultant's input in planning the coun-
seling session has also allowed the lawyers to accomplish their profes-
sional duties more effectively. While making the counseling session 
richer, the interdisciplinary collaboration has not undermined the law-
yers' duty to remain Rob's zealous advocates. 
The counseling session just described demonstrates how Rob's 
lawyers, having consulted with a skilled social work colleague, can as-
sist their client's decisionmaking in a much more nuanced way than 
the approach that a "crude" professional would likely take.72 But the 
vision of a crude professional is likely unrealistic. After all, even if a 
professional wanted to, neither the social worker nor the lawyer could 
really be actively paternalistic-they could not jab Rob with a needle 
and give him his meds, whether Rob wanted them or not. Rob, as a 
mature youth, will ultimately have the final say.73 
The collaboration worry-and this may be the biggest worry-is 
that the teamwork with a skilled social worker will lead the lawyers to 
be more manipulative and non-neutral than they would be if they 
were not coupled with a social worker. Rob will always have his law-
yers and will always get his legal defense at the IEP Team meeting if 
he needs it, but lawyers influenced by the wisdom of their social 
worker colleagues might work on him, and in ways that are much 
more likely to succeed-subtly, persuasively, kindly, effectively. They 
might make Rob believe that a decision to agree to a new round of 
medication is his choice, and a good choice. 
So the questions are: Is it likely that this concern is valid? Will a 
72 We borrow the term "crude" from William Simon, who used the word to describe 
different approaches to the ethical demands of lawyering. See William H. Simon, Ethical 
Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1083, 1084 (1988). 
73 One might argue that Rob's parent or guardian has the final say, and legally, as long 
as Rob is a minor, his rights would be voiced by the adult. However, medicating an active 
teenager against his will is so fraught with practical difficulties that Rob would need to buy 
into any medication regimen. 
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lawyer working with a caring, best interest-focused social worker be 
changed by him in a way that allows for more good-faith lawyer ma-
nipulation? If we think that answer is in some ways "yes," is that a 
bad thing professionally? If it is not, then the worry vanishes. But if 
we believe that such good intentioned, subtle persuasion is problem-
atic because it disrespects client autonomy, then lawyers engaged in 
interdisciplinary practice do face another ethical tension.74 Were this 
a novel issue unique to such collaboration, we might well worry that 
the concern is fatal to the interdisciplinary endeavor. However, attor-
neys have long recognized that they are capable of good-intentioned, 
effective manipulation.75 The problem is not new or unique to inter-
disciplinary work. Thus, while collaboration might increase the risk of 
attorney manipulation, it is not its root cause. 
Viewed from either side of the paternalism/zeal coin, lawyers 
consulting with social workers do risk becoming less zealous and more 
paternalistic. But, for the reasons we have outlined above, these con-
cerns are neither new nor unique to interdisciplinary endeavors. If 
these risks are problematic, they do not stem from the interdiscipli-
nary collaboration, but instead from the demands of effective law-
yering. Whether practicing solo or with the benefit of social work 
colleagues, lawyers will continue to struggle whenever they are con-
fronted with a client they feel is making a bad choice. At least in 
interdisciplinary practice, there is the solace of knowing that the coun-
seling sessions have been enriched with multiple professional perspec-
tives and that there are colleagues with whom to share the lawyers' 
angst. 
II. THE MANDATED REPORTING CONUNDRUM 
The preceding discussion has shown that lawyers working along-
side a social worker or similar helping professional might offer a 
richer quality of legal services as a result of that collaboration. But 
the collaboration itself introduces a possibly insidious difficulty that 
arises when a helping professional works in tandem with lawyers-the 
74 While we focus here on a potential breach of the lawyer's professional duties, we also 
care about any resulting professional dilemmas which social worker colleagues could face. 
As the scenario has unfolded in this paternalism scenario, however, we submit that the 
social worker has not violated any of his ethical mandates. Indeed the social worker has 
advised the lawyers and client of the likely consequences of Rob's decision on himself and 
others. The social worker's professional duties remain subordinate to those of the lawyers 
because of the explicit structure of this legal team: the lawyers retained him as a consultant; 
he is not providing direct service. See MoDEL RuLES, supra note 12, at R. 5.3 and text 
accompanying note 42, supra. 
75 See Stephen Ellmann, Lawyers and Clients, 34 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 717, 721 (1987); 
Kruse, supra note 18, at 75. 
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worry about inconsistent duties regarding confidentiality of client in-
formation. This is an issue that interdisciplinary clinicians raise often, 
and the one seemingly most elusive in its resolution.76 
For purposes of our analysis, we make some important prelimi-
nary distinctions which matter to our analysis. We first assess the re-
sponsibilities of a social worker working within a functioning law 
firm-an organization whose essential purpose is to provide legal ser-
vices (even if richer, interdisciplinary legal services) to clients. 77 We 
then compare that setting to a second social worker placement, in an 
organization which offers both legal services and mental health ser-
vices, side by side, and at times independent from one another.78 Fi-
nally, we take up yet a third iteration-using the second placement 
example (a setting offering both legal and social services) we inquire 
about the social worker's duties when a lawyer and a social worker 
collaborate within that agency on the same matter.79 
A. The Social Worker in a Conventional Law Firm 
1. The Puzzle Described 
We begin by placing a social worker in an office which is a func-
tional law office. Since much of our audience works at law schools, we 
will use a clinical program as our example here, even though this anal-
ysis applies to any law firm which employs a social worker.80 Let us 
assume, then, a law school clinic, operating as a self-contained law 
firm,81 with four faculty supervisor/lawyers, twenty-five law students 
76 We do understand from our conversations with social workers employed in legal 
settings that, while the question we raise is a very challenging one conceptually, it may in 
fact arise rather infrequently. We nevertheless believe that it deserves some careful, com-
prehensive analysis. In our assessment of this issue, we build on some existing scholarship 
which notes the tension but does not address it comprehensively. See, e.g., Galowitz, supra 
note 17; Gerard F. Glynn, Multidisciplinary Representation of Children: Conflicts over Dis-
closures of Client Communications, 27 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 617 (1994); St. Joan, supra 
note 4; Lois G. Trubek & Jennifer J. Farnham, Social Justice Collaboratives: Multidiscipli-
nary Practice for People, 7 CuN. L. REv. 227, 240 (2000); Heather A. Wydra, Keeping 
Secrets Within the Team: Maintaining Client Confidentiality While Offering Interdisciplinary 
Services to the Elderly Client, 62 FORDHAM L. REv. 1517 (1994). 
77 See infra Part II.A. 
78 See infra Part II.B.l. 
79 See infra Part II.B.2. 
80 We situate the lawyer and social worker in a law school clinic for the reasons de-
scribed in the previous part. See supra text accompanying note 34. The fact of the clinical 
setting does not affect our analysis of the mandatory reporting obligations in any way. 
81 This assumption seems self-evident, but in fact the example of a law school clinic 
might introduce complicated questions about the identity of the "firm," especially when 
several clinics operate within some defined space in a law school. For discussion of this 
topic, a topic which we have no reason to address here, see Peter A. Joy & Robert B. 
Kuehn, Conflict of Interest and Competency Issues in Law Clinic Practice, 9 CuN. L. REv. 
493 (2002). 
692 CLINICAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:659 
practlcmg law under a state court rule treating them as lawyer-
equivalents,82 and a faculty social worker. And let us assume further 
that in the course of that clinic's work, one of its clients discloses to a 
law student and to the faculty social worker some details about the 
client's husband's aggressive physical punishment of the couple's 
children. 
In all states, the law obligates a social worker acting in a profes-
sional capacity to report to a state agency evidence or suspicion of 
abuse or neglect of children or elders.83 In Massachusetts, for exam-
ple, a social worker who fails to comply with the mandated reporting 
statute risks a fine.84 In other states a social worker who fails to re-
82 See, e.g., MAss. SuP. Juo. CT. R. 3:03. 
83 See ALA. ConE§ 26-14-3 (2001); ALASKA STAT. § 47.17.020 (Michie 1999); ARIZ. 
REv. STAT. § 13-3620 (2001); ARK. CooE ANN. § 12-12-507 (Michie 2005); CAL. PENAL 
CooE § 11165.7 (West 2007);. Cow. REv. STAT. § 19-3-304 (2001); CoNN. GEN. STAT. 
§ 17a-101 (2001); DEL. ConE ANN. tit. 16, § 903 (2001); D.C. ConE ANN. § 4-1321.02 
(1990); FLA. STAT. ch. 39.201 (2002); GA. ConE ANN. § 19-7-5 (2002); HAw. REv. STAT. 
§ 350-1.1 (2002); IDAHO ConE § 16-1619 (Michie 2002); 325 ILL. CoMP. STAT. 5/4 (2002); 
IND. ConE § 31-33-5-1 (2002); IowA ConE § 232.69 (2002); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1522 
(2001); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 620.030 (Michie 2002); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:403 
(West 2002); ME. REv. STAT. tit. 22, § 4011-A (West 2001); Mo. ConE ANN., FAM. LAw 
§ 5-704 (2002); MASS. GEN. LAWS CH. 119, § 51A (2002); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.623 
(2002); MINN. STAT. § 626.556 (2001); Miss. ConE ANN. § 43-21-353 (2001); Mo. REv. 
STAT. § 210.115 (2001); MoNT. ConE ANN. § 41-3-201 (2002); NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-711 
(2002); NEV. REV. STAT. 432B.220 (2002); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-C:29 (2002); N.J. 
STAT. ANN.§ 9:6-8.10 (West 2002); N.M. STAT. ANN.§ 32A-4-3 (Michie 2002); N.Y. Soc. 
SERV. LAw§ 413 (Consol. 2002); N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 7B-301 (2001); N.D. CENT. ConE§ 50-
25.1-03 (2002); 0Hro REv. ConE ANN. § 2151.421 (Banks-Baldwin 2002); OKLA. STAT. tit. 
10, § 7103 (2002); OR. REv. STAT.§ 419B.010 (2001); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 6311 (West 
2002); R.I. GEN. LAws§ 40-11-3 (2002); S.C. ConE ANN.§ 20-7-510 (2001); S.D. CoDIFIED 
LAws § 26-8A-3 (Michie 2002); TENN. ConE ANN. § 37-1-403 (2002); TEx. FAM. ConE 
ANN. § 261.101 (Vernon 2001); UTAH CooE ANN. § 62A-4A-403 (2002); VT. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 33, § 4913 (2002); VA. CoDE ANN. § 63.2-1509 (Michie 2002); WAsH. REv. ConE 
§ 26.44.030 (2002); W. VA. CoDE § 49-6A-2 (2002); WIS. STAT. § 48.981 (2002); WYO. 
STAT. ANN. § 14-3-205 (Michie 2002). 
Our discussion uses a social worker as an example, but the statutes in question cover 
many, and indeed most, types of helping professionals, health care workers, school person-
nel, police, probation officers, and other persons who might encounter abuse and neglect in 
their occupational roles. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAws c. 119 § 51A, quoted infra at note 84. 
Some statutes include lawyers, as we discuss below (see note 96 infra), but those states 
offer an easy-if perhaps unsatisfactory-answer to the puzzle discussed here. 
84 See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 119 § 51A (2007) (requiring reporting of child abuse). 
Section 51A reads in relevant part as follows: 
Any physician, medical intern, hospital personnel engaged in the examination, care 
or treatment of persons, medical examiner, psychologist, emergency medical techni-
cian, dentist, nurse, chiropractor, podiatrist, optometrist, osteopath, public or private 
school teacher, educational administrator, guidance or family counselor, day care 
worker ... , probation officer, clerk/magistrate of the district courts, parole officer, 
social worker, foster parent, firefighter or policeman, licensor of the office of child 
care services or any successor agency, school attendance officer, allied mental health 
and human services professional as licensed pursuant to ... , drug and alcoholism 
counselor, psychiatrist, and clinical social worker, priest, rabbi, clergy member, or-
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port risks criminal85 or (less often) civil86 liability. In all states, a law-
yer87 is obligated by professional rules not to reveal such information 
without a client's consent unless some exception, largely not relevant 
here, may be found.88 If the social worker employed by a law firm is 
bound by his statutory obligations, then his mandated reporting duties 
will control, and he must report to state authorities information 
learned from the lawyers' clients, without the consent of (and, indeed, 
over the express objections of) the lawyer and the lawyer's client. In 
that instance, where an employee of the law firm has revealed infor-
mation when the lawyer lacks authority to do so, the lawyer will have 
breached a professional duty to the client. If, in contrast, the social 
worker's obligations are defined by his role as a member of a law firm 
team, then he, like the lawyers, will be obligated not to report that 
information to state authorities. The contrast in obligation and in be-
havior is dramatic, as is the effect on the client and, perhaps, on the 
victim of the abuse or neglect. 
The social worker employed by the law firm thus needs to know 
dained or licensed minister, leader of any church or religious body, accredited Chris-
tian Science practitioner, person performing official duties on behalf of a church or 
religious body that are recognized as the duties of a priest, rabbi, clergy, ordained or 
licensed minister, leader of any church or religious body, or accredited Christian Sci-
ence practitioner, or person employed by a church or religious body to supervise, 
educate, coach, train or counsel a child on a regular basis, who, in his professional 
capacity shall have reasonable cause to believe that a child under the age of eighteen 
years is suffering physical or emotional injury resulting from abuse inflicted upon 
him which causes harm or substantial risk of harm to the child's health or welfare 
including sexual abuse, or from neglect, including malnutrition, or who is determined 
to be physically dependent upon an addictive drug at birth, shall immediately report 
such condition to the [D]epartment [of Social Services] by oral communication and 
by making a written report within forty-eight hours after such oral communication; 
. . . . Any such person so required to make such oral and written reports who fails to 
do so shall be punished by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars. Any person 
who knowingly files a report of child abuse that is frivolous shall be punished by a 
fine of not more than one thousand dollars. 
See also MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 19A § 15 (required reporting of elder abuse and neglect). 
85 See, e.g. CAL. PENAL CoDE § 11166(c) (West 2007) ("Any mandated reporter who 
fails to report an incident of known or reasonably suspected child abuse or neglect as 
required by this section is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by up to six months confine-
ment in a county jail or by a fine of one thousand dollars ($1,000) or by both that imprison-
ment and fine."). 
86 See, e.g. Kimberly S.M. v. Bradford Central School, 649 N.Y.S.2d 588 (A.D. Dept. 
1996); see also Steven J. Singley, Comment, Failure to Report Suspected Child Abuse: Civil 
Liability of Mandated Reporters, 19 J. Juv. L. 236 (1998) (listing seven states with statutory 
civil liability for failure to report). See also note 153 infra and accompanying text. 
87 In states where a student may practice as a lawyer, the student's obligations are 
equivalent to those of fully licensed lawyers. See Joy & Kuehn, supra note 81, at 497-98. 
88 See, e.g., MAss. SuP. JuD. Cr. R. 3:07, R. 1.6. The template for most states' confiden-
tiality rules comes from the American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct. See MoDEL RuLES, supra note 12, R. 1.6. 
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whether his obligations are governed by the statute requiring him, as a 
social worker, to report suspected abuse and neglect to the state, or by 
the legal profession's binding rules requiring him, as a member of a 
law firm team, to maintain the secrets of his clients. Much rests on the 
answer to that puzzle. 89 
2. The Puzzle Assessed 
a. The Duty of Lawyers 
Let us start by describing the scope of the lawyer's duty of confi-
dentiality. It is obvious that if lawyers are required to report child or 
elder abuse and neglect, then the conflict of roles disappears, for both 
social workers and lawyers would be subject to the same reporting 
requirements. In fact, in most states lawyers have no such duty,90 so 
the role tension for the social worker remains. 
An assessment of a lawyer's responsibility requires that we start 
with the rules governing the ethical responsibilities of lawyers. In all 
states, a lawyer is prohibited, under penalty of professional discipline, 
from revealing her client's confidences unless the client consents or 
some exception to the duty of confidentiality exists.91 Since it would 
89 As Jacqueline St. Joan has written, in describing her interdisciplinary law school 
clinic's experience with this issue: 
What is a social worker in a law office to do when exposed to information that gives 
rise to a reasonable suspicion of child abuse or neglect? Report the information to 
authorities, as is required by mandatory reporting statutes, or keep the information 
confidential as attorneys are required to do? What is a lawyer who collaborates with 
a social worker required to disclose to clients about the mandatory reporting obliga-
tions of social workers in the office? Is the risk of disclosure too great to the client in 
the lawyer's view? Is the risk of nondisclosure too great to the child in the social 
worker's view? Whatever practices a clinic adopts with respect to collaborations, 
what are the effects of those practices on the well-being of children? 
St. Joan, supra note 4, at 426-28 (footnotes omitted). 
90 See Ellen Marrus, Please Keep My Secret: Child Abuse Reporting Statutes, Confiden-
tiality, and Juvenile Delinquency, 11 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 509, 516-20 (1998)(reviewing 
lawyers' obligations to report abuse and neglect). 
91 Most states have adopted some version of the ABA Model Rules, see supra note 12, 
and thus use an equivalent of Model Rule 1.6, which declares that lawyers shall not reveal 
"information related to the representation of a client" unless the client so permits, subject 
to some limited exceptions. See MoDEL RuLES, supra note 12, R. 1.6(a). See STEPHEN 
GILLERS & Rov D. SIMON, REGULATION oF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS 3 
(2007) (47 states and the District of Columbia have adopted a version of the Model Rules 
as of 2006). Fewer states employ a version of the ABA's Model Code of Professional 
Responsibility, which offers a client similar protection for "information gained in the pro-
fessional relationship that the client has requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of 
which would be embarrassing or would likely be detrimental to the client." See MoDEL 
CoDE, supra note 24, DR 4-101(A), (B)(1). See GILLERS & SIMON, supra, at 3 (2 states 
retain a version of the Model Code). California follows neither the Model Rules nor the 
Model Code, but by statute requires lawyers "[t]o maintain inviolate the confidence, and at 
every peril to himself to preserve the secrets of his client," see CAL Bus. & PRoF. CoDE 
§ 6068(e)(l), subject to one exception discussed below. See text accompanying note 93 
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be rare for a client to consent to disclosure of suspected abuse, the 
exceptions concerning future harm to third persons are more relevant. 
In states following the principles established by the ABA's standards, 
lawyers possess the discretion to reveal otherwise protected informa-
tion "to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm" 
(in Rules jurisdictions92 and California93) or to disclose "[t]he inten-
tion of [a] client to commit a crime and the information necessary to 
prevent the crime" (in Code jurisdictions94). There are, no doubt, 
many situations involving suspected child or elder abuse which would 
satisfy these requirements,95 affording lawyers permission to reveal 
the abuse to state authorities. But in states following the ABA's stan-
dards, and in California, no lawyering rule requires any such report.96 
Nine states, though, depart from the ABA's principles and man-
date that lawyers reveal information in some specified settings, almost 
always in an effort to prevent death or substantial bodily harm.97 In 
those states, a lawyer's duties and a social worker's duties are nearly 
coexistent-but not entirely so, and thus the tension which we de-
scribe here would still exist. Consider, for instance, a state such as 
Connecticut, which has adopted a child abuse reporting statute98 
infra. 
92 MoDEL RuLES, supra note 12, at R. 1.6(b)(1). 
93 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CoDE § 6068(e)(2) ("to prevent a criminal act that the attorney 
reasonably believes is likely to result in the death of, or substantial bodily harm to, an 
individual"). 
94 MoDEL CoDE, supra note 24, at DR 4-101(C)(3). See also N.Y. CaMP. CoDES R. & 
REGS. tit. 22, § 1200.19; DR 4-101(c)(3) (equivalent language). 
95 See, e.g., Howard Davidson, Reporting Suspicions of Child Abuse: What Must a Fam-
ily Lawyer Do?, 17-WTR FAM. ADvoc. 50 (1995); Robert P. Mosteller, Child Abuse Re-
porting Laws and Attorney-Client Confidences: The Reality and the Specter of Lawyer as 
Informant, 42 DuKE L.J. 203 (1992); Christine A. Picker, The Intersection of Domestic 
Violence and Child Abuse: Ethical Considerations and Tort Issues by Attorneys Who Re-
present Battered Women with Children, 12 ST. LoUis U. Pus. L. REv. 69 (1993); Robin 
Rosencrantz, Rejecting "Hear No Evil Speak No Evil": Expanding the Attorney's Role in 
Child Abuse Reporting, 8 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 327 (1995); Lisa Hansen, Note, Attorney's 
Duty to Report Child Abuse, 19 J. AM. AcAD. MATRIM. L. 59 (2004). 
96 For an argument that lawyers should be mandated reporters, at least in the context 
of financial exploitation, see Carolyn L. Dessin, Should Attorneys Have a Duty to Report 
Financial Abuse of the Elderly?, 38 AKRON L. REv. 707 (2005). For a contrary sentiment 
focusing on child abuse, see Adrienne Jennings Lockie, Salt in the Wounds: Why Attorneys 
Should Not Be Mandated Reporters of Child Abuse, 36 N.M. L. REv. 125 (2006). 
97 The nine states are Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Nevada, North Dakota, 
Texas, Virginia and Wisconsin. See GILLERS & SIMON, supra note 91, at 82-88. All but one 
of the nine states limit this duty to actions which are criminal, and most require a likeli-
hood of death or substantial bodily harm. /d. See, e.g., N.J. RuLES OF PRoF'L CoNDUCT R. 
1.6(b)(1) (2005). The lone exception is Florida, which declares that a lawyer "shall reveal" 
information the lawyer believes "necessary (1) to prevent a client from committing a crime 
or (2) to prevent death or substantial bodily harm to another." FL. ST. BAR Rule 4-1.6 
(2005). 
98 See CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17a-101(b). 
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which covers social workers,99 and also has a version of Rule 1.6 which 
states that "a lawyer shall reveal such information to the extent the 
lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent the client from com-
mitting a criminal act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in 
death or substantial bodily harm."100 It is easy to imagine a circum-
stance where a social worker and a lawyer working together in a law 
school clinic learn information from a client which the social worker 
would be obligated by the state statute to report, but which would not 
meet the standards of the lawyer's duty to report under Rule 1.6. Not 
all evidence of abuse covered by the social worker's reporting duty 
will qualify as a client's future "criminal act ... likely to result in ... 
substantial bodily harm. "101 
More specifically, the Connecticut statute imposes its duties upon 
any identified helping professional who "has reasonable cause to sus-
pect or believe that any child under the age of eighteen years (1) has 
been abused or neglected, as defined in section 46b-120, [or] (2) has 
had nonaccidental physical injury .... "102 A suspicion103 that a cli-
ent's child has suffered the abuse or the accident just described will 
frequently not be sufficient grounds for a lawyer to reveal that infor-
mation to a state agency to prevent "likely . . . death or substantial 
bodily harm." Therefore, even in a "mandatory lawyer reporting" ju-
risdiction like Connecticut, the reporting duties of a lawyer and those 
of a social worker will often remain in conflict.104 The question of 
whose duties control thus remains a critical one, even in such a 
jurisdiction.105 
Several states either expressly define lawyers as mandated report-
99 /d. 
100 CoNN. R. PRoF'L CoNover R. 1.6(b) (emphasis added). 
101 /d. 
102 CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17a-101(b). Section 46b-120 in turn provides: "(4) 
'abused' means that a child or youth (A) has been inflicted with physical injury or injuries 
other than by accidental means, or (B) has injuries that are at variance with the history 
given of them, or (C) is in a condition that is the result of maltreatment such as, but not 
limited to, malnutrition, sexual molestation or exploitation, deprivation of necessities, 
emotional maltreatment or cruel punishment." 
103 Statutes commonly refer to reasonable cause to "suspect" child abuse. While the 
term "suspect" or "suspicion" has not been defined explicitly, the available authority im-
plies that some reasonable inferences will be sufficient. See, e.g., Wilkenson ex rei. Wilken-
son v. Russell, 182 F.3d 89, 100 (2d Cir. 1999); Hawley v. Nelson, 968 F.Supp. 1372, 1386 
(E.D. Mo. 1997); Hazlett v. Evans, 943 F. Supp. 785, 787 (E.D. Ky. 1996). 
104 Another example of the disjuncture between the lawyers' reporting discretion and 
the social worker's reporting obligation is that of emotional injury, which is expressly cov-
ered by mandatory reporting statutes but is not covered by Rule 1.6's exception for "death 
or substantial bodily harm." 
105 See also note 109 infra (noting the requirement in Connecticut's rule that the client 
intend the crime, thus not covering crimes intended against the client or her family). 
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ers along with social workers and similar helping professionals,106 or 
require "all persons" to act as mandated reporters without exempting 
lawyers.107 In such states, the problem we address here simply does 
not exist, of course. Lawyers and social workers' obligation in those 
states are by statute coextensive, and no role tensions (at least in this 
realm) exist in those law firms. 
b. The Duty of Social Workers Employed By Lawyers 
Let us proceed, then, with the working hypothesis that a social 
worker working as a staff employee in a law firm in a state such as 
Connecticut will, on occasion, encounter evidence within the law firm 
which qualifies as reportable events under the state's mandated re-
porting law, but which at the same time is protected from revelation 
by the state's version of Rule 1.6. To make this hypothesis more con-
crete, let us develop a bit more the simple fact pattern described 
earlier:108 
A student lawyer, a faculty supervisor, and the clinic social worker 
meet with a woman, Sally, whom the clinic represents in a contested 
divorce proceeding against her husband Ted. During the meeting, 
Sally tells her legal team that Ted, when drinking, sometimes hits his 
6- and 8-year old children with his fists. The most recent incident of 
this violence occurred a month ago, when the family was reunited 
for a short spell. Right now the children stay with Sally, and visita-
tion and custody are matters for which the clinic is working on 
Sally's behalf. Sally believes that the children are safe as long as 
they are not left unsupervised with her husband. She does not want 
the state Department of Children and Families ("DCF") to get in-
volved in her life. 
The student lawyer who has heard the information cannot reveal it 
unless Sally consents.1°9 By contrast, unless his role within the clinic 
106 See M1ss. CoDE ANN. § 43-21-353 (2001); NEv. REv. STAT. 432B.220 (2002); OHIO 
REv. CoDE ANN. § 2151.421 (Banks-Baldwin 2002)(states identifying all attorneys as man-
dated reporters). See also ARK. CoDE ANN.§ 12-12-507 (Michie 2005); CAL. PENAL CoDE 
§ 11165.7 (West 2007); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAw§ 413 (Consol. 2002)(states identifying district 
attorneys/prosecuting attorneys as mandated reporters). 
107 States requiring "any person" to report abuse or neglect include Indiana, Louisiana, 
New Jersey, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, 
and Wyoming. See IND. CoDE § 31-33-5-1 (2002); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:403 (West 
2002); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.10 (West 2002); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-301 (2001); OKLA. 
STAT. tit. 10, § 7103 (2002); OR. REV. STAT. § 419B.010 (2001); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-11-3 
(2002); TENN. CoDE ANN. § 37-1-403 (2002); TEx. FAM. CoDE ANN. § 261.101 (Vernon 
2001); UTAH CoDE ANN. § 62A-4A-403 (2002); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 14-3-205 (Michie 
2002). 
108 See text accompanying note 82 supra. 
109 Recall that in Connecticut a lawyer "a lawyer shall reveal such information to the 
extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent the client from committing a 
criminal act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm." 
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provides some exemption, the social worker must report what he has 
learned to the state agency authorized to investigate child abuse. Let 
us assume that, for now, Sally and her legal team believe it prudent 
not to report Ted to the state agency. Sally will not permit reporting, 
and the student and her supervisor respect Sally's wishes and agree 
with her judgment that DCF intervention is not necessary at this time. 
Must the social worker nevertheless report the information? It is 
well accepted that a nonlawyer working as an employee in a law firm 
is bound to respect the lawyers' ethical obligations, and that lawyers 
must ensure that their employees do so.l1° According to Rule 5.3 of 
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, lawyers must make reason-
able efforts to ensure that nonlawyers working with them comply with 
the lawyers' ethical obligations.111 The Restatement (Third) of the 
Law Governing Lawyers, a treatise with no independent authority112 
but which aims to summarize the common law of lawyering, affirms 
that a lawyer may be liable for a breach of professional obligation if a 
"nonlawyer's conduct would be a violation of the applicable lawyer 
code if engaged in by a lawyer," if the lawyer has sufficient knowledge 
of that conduct.1 13 The Restatement does not directly describe the 
obligations of nonlawyers, but it plainly implies that nonlawyers, like 
the social worker in our example, must comply with the ethical obliga-
CoNN. R. PRoF'L CoNDUCT R. 1.6(b). In the example provided, the client has no intention 
to commit any crime, so the lawyer's obligation is not triggered, and the lawyer otherwise 
has no discretion to reveal the facts she learns from her client except if the client gives 
permission. 
no See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 24, § 11(4)(a), (b). 
Ill See MoDEL RuLEs, supra note 12, R. 5.3(c). It is true, though, that the text of Rule 
5.3(c) is not without its own ambiguity. The Rule, of course, only applies to lawyers, so it 
cannot declare in any explicit fashion that nonlawyers working in law firms must comply 
with all the lawyers' standards of professional conduct. Instead, it establishes the duties of 
lawyers to insure that their nonlawyer assistants comply with the lawyer's obligations. But, 
in understandable fairness to lawyers, its language offers some wiggle room, lest a lawyer 
risk being disciplined for an employee's actions when the lawyer had no responsibility for 
nor control over that conduct. Thus, a lawyer is in violation of Rule 5.3 only if she "orders, 
or with knowledge of the specific conduct, ratifies the conduct" (id. at R. 5.3(c)(1)), or 
has direct supervisory authority over the person, and knows of the conduct at a time 
when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take remedial action. 
/d. at 5.3(c)(2). 
112 See Lawrence J. Latto, The Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers: A View from 
the Trenches, 26 HOFSTRA L. REv. 697 (1998) (review of the deliberation and debate about 
the Restatement); Harold G. Maier, The Utilitarian Role of a Restatement of Conflicts in a 
Common Law System: How Much Judicial Deference Is Due to the Restaters or "Who are 
These Guys, Anyway?," 75 IND. L.J. 541, 548 (2000) (Restatement has no independent 
legal force); Ted Schneyer, The ALI's Restatement and the ABA's Model Rules: Rivals or 
Complements?, 46 OKLA. L. REv. 25, 30 (1993); Fred C. Zacharias, Fact and Fiction in the 
Restatement of Law Governing Lawyers: Should the Confidentiality Provisions Restate the 
Law?, 6 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 903, 926 (1993). 
113 RESTATEMENT, supra note 24, § 11(4)(b). 
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tions of the law firm's lawyers.114 
It may be tempting to conclude that the lawyer's Rule 5.3 obliga-
tion confirms that a social worker working within a law firm must 
comply with Rule 1.6 in all respects, but Rule 5.3's strictures cannot 
support that conclusion. A law firm might respond to the cross-pro-
fessional role tension either by refusing to collaborate with any man-
dated reporter, and thus fully protecting its client's secrets, or 
alternatively by establishing stringent protocols ("walls"115) to deter 
access by any mandated reporter to the kind of disclosures which 
might trigger his reporting duty, combined with an informed consent 
protocol by which a client would authorize the reporting in those in-
stances where the walls have failed.116 Either stance seemingly would 
satisfy Rule 5.3. No commentator has ever proposed the former, but 
many commentators assume the latter as a given in interdisciplinary 
collaboration.117 Both stances inhibit substantially the prospect of ef-
fective interdisciplinary lawyering work, the former inherently so, and 
the latter by its ineluctable interference with the free sharing of infor-
mation among lawyers, clients, and law firm employees.118 
Our aim here is to investigate whether a law firm indeed must 
make the choice either to eschew interdisciplinary work entirely or to 
establish internal walls to limit free communication about client infor-
mation. If the mandate to report survives the collaboration, then a 
law firm must make that choice. If the mandate to report does not 
apply to law firm employees, then the firm is free to represent its cli-
ents in the conventional manner. The question we investigate, then, 
may be stated in this way: Where applicable law forbids a law firm, 
114 The Restatement does not offer any direct authority for its proposition, but it is a 
non-controversial one. The cases it cites as authority tend to arise in the context of unau-
thorized solicitation-where a law firm clerical staff member has solicited business in a 
manner forbidden by the lawyers' professional codes. See, e.g., Mays v. Neal, 938 S.W.2d 
830 (Ark. 1997); Florida Bar v. Lawless, 640 So.2d 1098 (Fla. 1994); In re Schreiber, 632 
N.E.2d 362 (Ind. 1994). 
115 See St. Joan, supra note 4, at 437-39 (describing her clinic's "confidentiality walls"). 
116 No firm-wide protocols can ensure that a mandated reporter employed within the 
firm will never encounter client information triggering a reporting duty. That duty may be 
triggered by information learned from a client, from a third party, from a lawyer's or 
paralegal's conversations, or from a document in a client's file. See District of Columbia 
Bar Association Ethics Op. 282 (1998) [hereinafter DC Op. 282] ("the analysis [of a report-
ing obligation] does not change depending on the source of the information"). Because of 
the inherent risks involved in establishing such protective protocols, if the reporting duty in 
fact applies, a client must be informed of that risk and must consent to any resulting disclo-
sures. Otherwise, a law firm will have breached its duties to maintain the confidentiality of 
its client's information. 
117 See Retkin, Stein & Draimin, supra note 4, at 556-57; St. Joan, supra note 4, at 437-
39; Dina Schlossberg, An Examination of Transactional Law Clinics and Interdisciplinary 
Education, 11 WASH. U. J.L. & PoL'Y 195, 222-26 (2003). 
118 See infra text accompanying notes 166-67. 
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including its staff, to reveal its client secrets, and where a member of 
the law firm's staff would, if employed in a professional capacity else-
where, be required by applicable law to report suspected abuse and 
neglect, which of the competing legal obligations survives? 
There exists some limited authority from ethics committees and 
attorney general opinions, but no reported appellate or trial court de-
cisions, addressing this question.119 Several law review articles note 
the tension between the duties, but without offering a discrete resolu-
tion to it.l20 None of the available authority offers any binding ruling 
on the question we investigate.121 Because of the absence of any relia-
ble authority, we address the question as though we were a court122 
hearing the matter as one of first impression. What ought to be the 
correct answer to this question?123 
Our assessment is that a court facing this dilemma would likely 
conclude that a social worker employed within a law firm ought to be 
treated as a member of a legal team and not as a free-standing social 
worker.l24 We conclude that the arguments supporting this proposi-
119 See DC Op. 282, supra note 116; Kansas Att'y Gen. Op. No. 01-28, 2001 WL 930603 
(2001) [hereinafter Kansas AG Op. 01-28]; Los Angeles County Public Defender, Social 
Workers' Obligations When Confronted with Observations or Evidence of Reportable Child 
Abuse, Policies and Procedures Opinion E-2 (2000) [hereinafter LAPD Op. E-2]; Mary-
land Atty. Gen. Op. 90-007, 75 Md. Op. Att'y Gen. 76, 1990 WL 595302 (1990) [hereinafter 
Maryland AG Op. 90-007]; State Bar of Nevada, Standing Comm. on Ethics and Profes-
sional Responsibility Op. 30 (2005) [hereinafter Nevada Op. 30]; see also Gina Yarbrough 
& Ann E. Tobey, When Professional Responsibilities Conflict: Attorney-Client Privilege v. 
Mandated Reporting, in WHo SPEAKS FOR THis CHILD? (Mass. Cont. Legal Educ. 1999) 
(lawyer's obligations override statutory mandated reporting duties). 
120 Professor Jacqueline St. Joan implies that a social worker may report at his discre-
tion, and offers reasons why he might not want to do so. Otherwise, she assumes that a 
social worker who actually possesses the reportable information will report it. See St. Joan, 
supra note 4, at 457. Professor Gerald Glynn reports that case law has not yet resolved this 
issue. Glynn, supra note 76, at 641. 
121 The Kansas Attorney General opinion, see note 119 supra, offers legal analysis but it 
does not have the force of law in that state. See Perry v. Board of County Com'rs of 
County of Franklin, 281 Kan. 801, 132 P.3d 1279 (2006)(Kansas Attorney General opinions 
are not binding on courts). 
122 We imagine ourselves as a court rather than an ethics committee, for two reasons. 
First, the opinions of ethics committees are usually entirely advisory and non-binding. See 
U.S. v. Smallwood, 365 F. Supp.2d 689 (E.D. Va. 2005); Papyrus Technology Corp. v. New 
York Stock Exchange, Inc., 325 F. Supp.2d 270 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). Second, the question 
posed in this Part has its most critical implications for matters governed by state courts-
discipline for the lawyers or criminal or civil penalties for the mandated reporters. 
123 We note here our potential biases, given where we work and how we work. Lynn 
Barenberg is a social worker employed by the Boston College Legal Assistance Bureau, 
where Alexis Anderson and Paul Tremblay work as clinical instructors. Our comfort level, 
and that of our clients, favors a conclusion which protects Lynn from having to reveal client 
secrets. But we also emphasize our explicit aspiration, in the scholarly tradition, to be as 
dispassionate as possible in our assessment of the arguments we identify. We hope to be as 
transparent as possible as we assess the competing considerations. 
124 See Nevada Op. 30, supra note 119, at 9 (on the conflict between a Nevada attorney's 
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tion are not without considerable doubt, but on balance are more per-
suasive than their opposing counterparts. We also assert that this 
conclusion applies regardless of the role played by the social worker 
within the law firm, so long as he is in fact part of the interdisciplinary 
lawyering team which is representing the client. As we see below,l25 
in hybrid offices offering separate social services and legal services, 
but not in an integrated fashion, the conclusion we draw likely cannot 
survive. 
Our conclusion is grounded in two understandings, which to-
gether we find persuasive. First, we are by definition126 concerned 
with jurisdictions in which lawyers are not obligated to serve as man-
dated reporters (and often would be prohibited from making such re-
ports over a client's objection), reflecting a considered choice by the 
legislature that the benefits of the attorney-client confidentiality prin-
ciple outweigh whatever benefits ensue from mandated reporting. 
Second, those relatively rare court decisions considering the scope of a 
lawyer's permission to reveal client secrets in order to prevent immi-
nent harm tend to stress the importance of a client's trust that a law-
yer will only breach confidences in the most extreme circumstances.127 
These two considerations, after weighing them against the competing 
contrary considerations, lead us to the conclusions we reach.128 
We start with the recognition that in each of the statutory 
schemes with which we are concerned, a state legislature has imposed 
upon certain identified helping professions a requirement that their 
members breach whatever preexisting confidentiality duties they 
might have to their clients or patients and report to some authorities 
any suspected abuse and neglect of children and elders. In each of the 
jurisdictions in that universe, the legislature has opted to exclude the 
Rule 1.6 duties and mandated reporting duties, predicting that "when faced with the issue 
the Nevada Supreme Court will place the duty of confidentiality ahead of the statutory 
reporting obligation"). 
125 See text accompanying notes 156 infra. 
126 See text accompanying notes 97-107 supra. 
127 See, e.g., Purcell v. Dist. Atty., Suffolk, 676 N.E.2d 436,440 (Mass. 1997) (concluding 
that the Rule 1.6 exceptions "chill[] free discourse between lawyer and client and reduc[e] 
the prospect that the lawyer will learn of a serious threat to the well-being of others"). 
128 In arriving at our conclusion, we accept a premise which we ought to make explicit 
here. We assume that in the settings where the statutory mandate will not apply, the social 
worker's "client" is essentially the lawyers, or the law firm. As we see below, see infra text 
at note 156, our conclusion changes when the social worker has established a professional 
relationship with the lawyer's client independent of the lawyer's consulting with the social 
worker. Thus, to the extent that the social worker must have some client when he offers 
his assistance, we assume that his client is the lawyer or the law firm. See Carl M. Selinger, 
The Problematical Role of the Legal Ethics Expert Witness, 13 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 405, 
410-15 (2000) (noting that lawyers serving as expert witnesses do not establish an attorney-
client relationship with the client of the lawyer hiring the expert). 
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legal profession from this requirement. One might debate the wisdom 
of that exclusion as a principled matter,129 or one might cynically won-
der whether the exclusion is indeed principled at all, but instead a 
reflection of the political and contributory clout of lawyers relative to 
those professions which were not excluded.130 But, as a matter of sub-
stantive law, the distinction between the professions is unambiguous. 
The inferences that flow from that distinction are relatively un-
ambiguous. The state legislatures have concluded that confidentiality 
within the attorney-client relationship is more sacred than that within 
the other helping professions. The state lawmakers have decided that, 
whatever the benefits might be to actual or potential victims of report-
ing suspected abuse or neglect, those benefits do not outweigh the 
harm such reporting would cause to the lawyer/client relationship.131 
Perhaps the legislators understood that lawyers already have express 
discretion to disclose the information necessary to prevent serious, im-
minent harm to victims, 132 and thus did not perceive the need for ad-
ditional reporting obligations. We might speculate about the reasons, 
but the baseline conclusion is plain-lawyers are exempt from the 
broader helping professions' duties to report abuse. 
Given this premise, it is difficult to conclude that a legislature 
intended that lawyers who hire social workers on staff should, simply 
because of that fact, suddenly be governed by the reporting duty. A 
report by a social worker is, of course, identical to a report by a law-
yer. The confidentiality and privilege duties otherwise applying to the 
lawyer/client interaction would be breached. 
The limited authority available from agencies, bar associations 
and attorney general offices does not undermine this conclusion, al-
though that authority confirms the thorniness and the ambiguity sur-
rounding this question. In addition, while some precedent on the 
relationship between the attorney-client privilege and mandated re-
porting duties might appear inconsistent with the conclusion we arrive 
at, on reflection that precedent is distinguishable, as we address be-
129 For a rich discussion of the skeptical basis for the confidentiality principle, see Fred 
C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 IowA L. REv. 351 (1989). 
130 Were doctors not included as mandated reporters, the cynic's argument would be 
more substantial. But in all of the states where our question matters, physicians and psy-
chiatrists of every stripe are mandated reporters, and lawyers are not. See, e.g., CoNN. 
GEN. STAT. § 17a-101 (2001); FLA. STAT. ch. 39.201 (2002); MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 119, 
§ 51A (2002). Because doctors as a professional group seem to be as politically and finan-
cially endowed as lawyers, the cynic's view is interesting but not persuasive. 
131 See Brook Albrandt, Note, Turning in the Client: Child Abuse Reporting Require-
ments and the Criminal Defense of Battered Women, 81 TEx. L. REv. 655, 666-672 (2002) 
(presenting policy arguments against making attorneys mandatory reporters in the specific 
context of family/domestic violence cases). 
132 MoDEL RuLES, supra note 12, at R. 1.6(b )(2). 
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low. We first look at the few published pronouncements on the ques-
tion we are attempting to answer. 
At least two sources have questioned whether a social worker 
employed by a law firm ought to be deemed as practicing in a "profes-
sional capacity" for purposes of a state's mandated reporting law. The 
Los Angeles County Public Defender (LAPD) issued a formal opin-
ion addressing the mandated reporting obligations of social workers 
working within the Public Defender's office. That agency concluded 
that a social worker working within the LAPD office is not a "health 
care practitioner" when serving as a consultant to the LAPD lawyers, 
and thus is not subject to the California statute.l33 The opinion stated 
that: 
There is nothing in the Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act 
which indicates that the legislature intended to abrogate the firmly-
established rules regarding the attorney-client relationship and the 
application of that privilege to experts. . . . [I]t is thus apparent that 
the legislature intended the attorney-client privilege to remain in-
tact. Indeed, given the strong policy basis for the attorney-client 
privilege, and the long history of that provision, it should not be 
found to be repealed without a specific statement by the Legislature 
to that effect.134 
Similarly, the ethics committee for the State Bar of Nevada, describ-
ing a legal aid organization which used teams of lawyers, law students, 
and social work students to provide interdisciplinary legal services 
(but no direct social work services) to clients, concluded that for pur-
poses of the state's reporting laws "the social work students are legal 
assistants in this context, [and] they are bound by [the attorneys' 
rules] to the same extent as the lawyer. "135 
133 See LAPD Op. E-2, supra note 119. The California statutes interpreted by the 
LAPD in its opinion imposed a reporting duty on a "health care practitioner ... in his or 
her professional capacity or within the scope of his or her employment." CAL. PENAL 
ConE §§ 11164, 11165.8(a). The Public Defender concluded that these statutes did not 
apply to a social worker working as a consultant to the Public Defender, reasoning: 
The ultimate conclusion to be drawn from this [analysis] is that the Legislature has 
taken no action to affirmatively abrogate the attorney-client privilege [sic) in the 
child abuse reporting statutes .... A person who might come within the definition of 
a "health care practitioner" if employed for the purposes of providing health care 
cannot be found to remain a "health care practitioner" when employed for the pur-
pose of assisting in the provision of legal representation to a litigant. 
LAPD Op. E-2, supra note 119, at 4 (emphasis in the original). The opinion's reference to 
the "attorney client privilege," and not to the ethical obligation, is not a mistaken use of 
terms. In California, the "privilege" established by statute covers both evidentiary matters 
and an attorney's out-of-court ethical obligations of confidentiality. CAL. Evm. ConE 
§ 955. 
134 LAPD Op. E-2, supra note 119, at 3. 
135 Nevada Op. 30, supra note 119, at 3. The committee wrote that "[t)he policies and 
practices of the organization are clearly designed to require the social work students to 
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The reasoning of the two opinions supports the reasoning we of-
fer here, and helps account for the distinction developed below be-
tween social workers employed in-house as consultants to lawyers and 
those offering some social work services to the lawyer's clients. Since 
those mandated reporting statutes which impose a duty on certain 
identified helping professionals (and not on the population at large) 
tend to require that the actor serve in some professional capacity 
before the reporting duty is triggered,136 the position of the LAPD 
and the Nevada ethics committee would apply to most consulting so-
cial workers employed by law firms. 
The District of Columbia Bar Association Ethics Committee is 
the only authority thus far to issue a formal ethics opinion on the pre-
cise question addressed here.137 That committee assessed the role of 
Rule 1.6 of the D.C. Rules of Professional Conduct and its applicabil-
ity to a social worker employee of a law firm. Its opinion concluded 
that, for purposes of the lawyers' confidentiality duties, the social 
worker is a lawyer equivalent, and is bound by Rule 1.6 and the attor-
ney client privilege: 
[W]e conclude that in the circumstances presented here Rule 1.6( e) 
allows no exception to the duty to ensure that the social worker 
preserves the confidences and secrets of the lawyer's client. We be-
lieve this interpretation of Rule 1.6 is consistent not only with its 
strict limitations on disclosures of client confidences and secrets but 
also with its recognition that lawyers require assistance of other pro-
fessionals and lay people to represent their clients properly.l38 
The committee concluded that "[i]t is arguable that the social 
worker has no mandatory reporting obligations in these circum-
stances."139 It also concluded, however, that "[t]he Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct cannot insulate a social worker from obligations 
limit their participation to that of a legal assistant and to require them to understand and 
observe the rules of attorney-client confidentiality applicable to legal assistants." !d. at 1. 
However, because in Nevada lawyers are also mandated reporters under the state report-
ing statute, the committee's opinion did not address the stark difference in reporting duties 
that the text addresses. 
136 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CooE §§ 11164, 11165.8(a); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 17a-
10l(b); MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 119, § 51A. 
137 DC Op. 282, supra note 116. The State Bar of Nevada's Committee on Ethics and 
Professional Responsibility issued an opinion relating to this topic, but focusing on a differ-
ent question. See Nevada Op. 30, supra note 119. Because in Nevada lawyers are man-
dated reporters, the Nevada ethics committee was ·asked to decide whether the mandatory 
obligation of lawyers to maintain the confidences of their clients trumped the statutory 
obligation to report possible child abuse or neglect learned during the professional 
relationship. 
138 DC Op. 282, supra note 116, at 2-3. 
139 !d. at n.4. 
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otherwise imposed by law,"14o and that 
the social worker may have a statutory duty to report child abuse or 
neglect that is inconsistent with the duty of both the lawyer and the 
social worker to preserve confidences and secrets imposed by the 
Rules of Professional Conduct.141 
705 
Noting the "quandary" the law firm finds itself in, with the "anomaly" 
of the social worker obligated by the lawyers' code to remain quiet, 
but obligated by a statute to reveal suspected abuse, the committee 
suggests that the lawyers and social workers warn clients that the so-
cial worker "may have a statutory duty to report" suspected abuse 
revealed by the clients.142 
This otherwise thoughtful opinion ends up straddling the question 
we hope to answer here. A plausible reason for its reluctance to de-
cide the question outright is reflected in the following caveat from the 
opinion: 
The Committee is limited to expressing opinions concerning law-
yers' ethics, and therefore cannot decide the scope of the social 
worker's obligations under the mandatory reporting law.143 
140 /d. at 3. 
141 /d. (emphasis added). 
142 /d. at 4. The reluctant conclusion offered by the DC panel is essentially that option 
prudently chosen by the interdisciplinary clinic at the University of Denver School of Law, 
described in a recent article by Professor Jacqueline St. Joan. See St. Joan, supra note 4. 
143 DC Op. 282, supra note 116, at 2 (emphasis added). As a pure aside, we have long 
been puzzled by this common but rather arbitrary and not entirely sensible distinction 
drawn by writers of ethics opinions. Ethics committees regularly draw a clear distinction 
between "ethics," represented by the Rules or Code in effect in the panel's jurisdiction, 
and "law," represented by everything else that would constitute "law"-statutes, common 
law, administrative regulations, and the like. The writers accept full responsibility for com-
plex and, at times, effectively binding analysis about the former, see Peter A. Joy, Making 
Ethics Opinions Meaningful: Toward More Effective Regulation of Lawyers' Conduct, 15 
GEo. J. LEGAL ETHics 313, 335-37 (2002), but deny any authority for interpretations, bind-
ing or otherwise, about the latter. 
We do not see such a clear distinction at all. Ethics committees draft opinions to assist 
lawyers in making difficult ethical decisions in their work. Frequently, the difficult choices 
facing lawyers implicate ethical rules and other state and federal law. To assume, as com-
mittees do, that the ethical rules are not substantive law is misguided. The rules governing 
lawyers are important and complicated, and represent a serious manifestation of substan-
tive law. See, e.g., Hamilton v. State Bar of California, 591 P.2d 1254, 1259 (Cal. 1990) 
(disbarment for violation of professional rules); Stanley v. Richmond, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 768, 
776 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (breach of rule is breach of fiduciary duty); Attorney Grievance 
Comm'n v. Pennington, 387 Md. 565, 589,876 A.2d 642,656 (2005) (attorney disbarred for 
violating several rules of professional conduct); see also Lester Brickman, Ethical Issues in 
Asbestos Litigation, 33 HoFSTRA L. REv. 833 (2005) (describing Huber v. Taylor, No. 02-
0304 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 6, 2002), where plaintiffs sued their lawyers for return of millions of 
dollars in fees paid, alleging a violation of the rules of professional conduct). The ethical 
rules and codes are just as much "law" as a mandatory reporting statute. See W. BRADLEY 
WENDEL, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS 4 (2004) 
(describing the "legally binding rules"). The members of an ethics committee are equally 
qualified to develop opinions about the latter as they are to develop opinions about the 
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The implication from the committee's opinion is that, if it had jurisdic-
tion to address the legal question, it would hold that social workers 
working within a law firm are not mandated reporters. But lacking 
the authority to make such a holding, the committee stakes out a con-
servative stance.144 
No other published decision or opinion has addressed the ques-
tion as directly as do the LAPD's opinion or the Nevada and D.C. 
ethics committees' opinions.145 These few available sources of refer-
ence146 persuade us that the analysis presented here is not inconsistent 
with the limited authority available on this question. We also note 
that some doctrine has developed surrounding the interplay of abuse 
and neglect reporting statutes and the attorney-client privilege.147 
former. And yet, as we see in this case, the distinction remains a formidable one. 
144 The Ethics Committee also relies on Comment [27] to D.C.'s Rule 1.6, "expressing a 
presumption against other laws superseding a lawyer's obligation of confidentiality." DC 
Op. 282, supra note 116, at n. 5. This comment is based on former Comment [21] to the 
ABA Model Rules, which was eliminated in the Ethics 2000 Commission's revisions to 
Rule 1.6. 
145 Two attorney general opinions have dealt with the question, but neither offers any 
further insights beyond those already identified. See Kansas AG Op. 01-28, supra note 
119; Maryland AG Op. 90-007, supra note 119. 
The Kansas Attorney General opinion addressed the same question as the D.C. ethics 
committee, and relied explicitly on that committee's opinion without any independent 
analysis. See Kansas AG Op. 01-28, supra. That result is unfortunate, because while the 
DC ethics committee lacked authority to handle questions of law outside of the lawyer's 
rules, the Kansas Attorney General seems to possess such authority. The language of its 
opinion supports this inference: "While we typically leave issuance of lawyer ethics opin-
ions to the Kansas Bar Association and the Disciplinary Administrator's Office, because 
your question is directed more toward the social worker's obligation under the law, we 
offer the following analysis." /d. at 2. See also KAN. STAT. ANN. §75-704 (authorizing the 
Attorney General to offer legal opinions). 
The Maryland Attorney General opinion concerned mental health providers who re-
ceived referrals from lawyers, rather than working within the lawyers' offices. See Mary-
land AG Op. 90-007, supra, at 1. The opinion concluded that those providers were "acting 
in a professional capacity" and therefore were bound by their statutory reporting duties. 
/d. at 2. The opinion did conclude, though, that as a matter of Sixth Amendment constitu-
tional doctrine the providers' reporting duties were trumped by the lawyer's privilege and 
ethical obligations "after the initiation of a criminal proceeding." /d. at 3. 
146 We note that one further source addresses this question, but in a rather limited fash-
ion. See Yarbrough & Tobey, supra note 119. In their chapter in a Massachusetts practi-
tioner manual, Yarbrough and Tobey conclude that a social worker serving as a consultant 
or agent in a law firm is not bound by that state's mandatory reporting statute, which 
covers social workers explicitly but does not mention lawyers. /d. at 74. The authors focus 
in their analysis on the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine, however, 
without addressing the separate ethical obligations lawyers face under Rule 1.6. See MAss. 
RuLES OF PRoF'L CoNoucr, R. 1.6 (2005). For that reason their input is of less direct 
relevance here, but their conclusion is consistent with that developed here. 
147 See, e.g. Carolyn L. Dessin, Protecting the Older Client in Multi-Generation Represen-
tations, 38 FAM. L.Q. 247,259 (2004); Nancy E. Stuart, Child Abuse Reporting: A Challenge 
to Attorney-Client Confidentiality, 1 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHics 243, 245-46 (1987); Profes-
sional Liability for Failure to Report Child Abuse, 38 AM. JuR. TRIALS 1 (2007). 
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That doctrine, however, is sufficiently distinct from the present ques-
tion, and thus does not compel a change in the conclusion we reach 
here.t4s 
Our analysis may offer some benefit to a social worker or law-
yer149 who follows it in good faith while acknowledging a reporting 
148 For a rich example of that interplay, see, e.g., Matter of a Grand Jury Investigation, 
437 Mass. 340 (2002). This criminal proceeding involved charges filed against a private 
high school after several students reported "hazing" practices which included sexually abu-
sive activity. The prosecution alleged that the school criminally failed to report the sexual 
abuse of its students in violation of its mandated reporting obligations. /d. at 341. During 
pretrial proceedings, the school objected to production of internal investigative reports 
from teachers to the school's lawyers, claiming that the papers were privileged under the 
doctrine of Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981). After concluding that the 
reports contained information the teachers were required to disclose under the state's 
mandated reporting law, the court declared: 
[U]nquestionably the attorney-client privilege may conflict with a different public 
policy where the Legislature has determined that an institution must disclose certain 
information to others. Here, it is clear on the record that under any reasonable view 
of the attorney-client privilege, the school's internal investigation documents are not 
protected .... The teachers and school officials ... knew, or should have known, that 
they would have no "right to keep secret" any information disclosed by the internal 
investigation concerning possible abuse victims .... 
/d. at 351-52 (emphasis in original). One might read the quoted language as deciding di-
rectly the question we face here, but that reading would be mistaken. The teachers' obliga-
tions accrued when they learned of the abuse in their capacity as teachers. That obligation 
cannot be extinguished by later sharing the known information with a lawyer. Because the 
obligation to report preceded any claim of privilege, the privilege claim must fail. The 
question would be completely different if a student had reported the abuse to his lawyer, 
with a social worker sitting in as a consultant to the lawyer. Of course, no charges were 
ever lodged against the lawyers for failing to report the abuse learned from the teachers, 
because, the worries about the children notwithstanding, the lawyers had no obligation to 
report that information without their clients' consent. 
149 One might assume that the question we address has its greatest personal implications 
for the social worker, who faces possible prosecution for violation of the mandatory report-
ing statute. It also has indirect implications for the law firm, whose clients' secrets may be 
disclosed. But does the presence of the mandatory reporting statute present any personal 
risk to the lawyer? We cannot confidently say no. Here's why. Assume that a law firm 
employs a social worker, and the lawyers advise the social worker, relying on the kind of 
analysis developed here, that he does not need to report suspected child abuse notwith-
standing the language of the state statute. If the firm guesses wrong, the social worker is of 
course at risk. But the lawyers may be at some risk as well for assisting in a criminal act. 
The lawyers conceivably could face sanctions under the governing Rules of Professional 
Conduct. Rule 1.2(d) prohibits a lawyer from assisting a client in illegal conduct, see 
MODEL RuLES, supra note 12, at R. 1.2( d), and if the lawyers advise the social worker 
about his legal rights and obligations, the latter seems to become the client of the former. 
(Note that Rule 8.4(b), prohibiting a lawyer from "commit[ing] a criminal act that reflects 
adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer .... " does not seem 
to apply here. /d. at R. 8.4(b)(emphasis added).) Other criminal law doctrine or state 
statutes might criminalize a lawyer's assisting another in criminal conduct. See, e.g., United 
States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1964)(1awyer convicted for assisting client with 
financial fraud). Of course, the requirement of criminal intent for any such prosecution 
seems very difficult to meet, if the lawyers in fact are relying upon a careful analysis as we 
have tried to provide here. 
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statute's plain language. It appears unlikely that a social worker em-
ployed within a law firm who does not report suspected abuse, but 
acts in reliance on a legal opinion from his law firm colleagues,150 has 
committed a criminal act, especially if the "crime" requires some mens 
rea.151 Indeed, few reported cases can be found involving prosecution 
of a professional for failing to report suspected abuse under the 51 
mandatory reporting statutes existing across the United States.152 We 
have discovered more instances, though, of a non-reporting social 
worker encountering a civil claim for damages from an injured victim, 
a claim which most often has not succeeded.153 
150 Another interesting question arising here is whether a lawyer from the law firm em-
ploying the social worker may offer advice to that social worker about his obligations 
under the applicable state statute. The question is one of permissible conflicts of interest. 
We might assume that the interests of the lawyer's clients favor advice to the social worker 
not to report, while the social worker needs an independent assessment of his rights and 
obligations. If the lawyer offers an opinion to the social worker about the applicability of 
the statute, then the social worker becomes a "client" of the lawyer for that purpose. See, 
e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 24, at§ 14 (defining who qualifies as a client). In advising 
her social worker client, the law firm member might then face "a significant risk that the 
representation of one ... client[] [i.e., the social worker] will be materially limited by the 
lawyer's responsibilities to another client, ... or by a personal interest of the lawyer." 
MoDEL RuLES, supra note 12, at R. 1.7(a)(2). The limitations arise from the lawyer's 
commitment to preserve her client's secrets, and her personal interest in working in a law 
firm with an unconstrained social worker. 
If the interaction does qualify as a conflicted one, the question turns to whether the 
conflict is waivable by the social worker. See id. at R. 1.7(b). Our reasoning is that it is 
indeed a waivable conflict, because the lawyer can conclude reasonably that she has the 
capacity to "provide competent and diligent representation to" the social worker. It is not 
at all inconceivable to imagine that the lawyer desires genuinely to arrive at the right an-
swer to the social worker's question, not simply an answer that makes her clients most 
happy. The risks of offering wrong advice are profound, and not just to the social worker. 
A competent client, like the social worker, may reasonably accept the representation of the 
potentially-conflicted lawyer, and thus the conflict may be waived. See also RESTATE-
MENT, supra note 24, at §122 (describing the conditions of permissible waivers of conflicts 
of interest). 
151 See generally, 22 C.J.S. CRIMINAL LAw § 37 (2005) ("the word 'willfully' generally 
means a voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty in bad faith or with evil 
purpose"). 
152 See Arthur Gross Schaefer & Darren Levine, No Sanctuary From The Law: Legal 
Issues Facing Clergy, 30 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 177, 183 (1996)("Mandatory reporters face 
possible criminal liability for failure to report"), citing Stecks v. Young, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
475 (Cal. App. 1995); People v. Hodges, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 412 (Cal. App. 1992). 
!53 Our research has found a considerable number of cases involving tort damage claims 
against mandated reporters or their employers for failure to report suspected abuse or 
neglect adequately. Many of those claims are unsuccessful, but not all. For a sampling of 
the decisions, see, e.g., Cooper Clinic, P.A. v. Barnes, 366 Ark. 533 (2006) (no private right 
of action against social worker); Ward v. Greene, 839 A.2d 1259 (Conn. 2004) (liability 
runs only in favor of children about whom report was mandated, not to parent of a child 
later abused); Manifold ex rei. Zaks v. Ragaglia, 2006 WL 1828461 (Conn. Super. 2006) (no 
liability on the facts; immunity found); McGarrah v. Posig, 635 S.E.2d 219 (Ga. App. 2006) 
(no private right of action); Estate of Peasant v. County of Seneca, 768 N.Y.S.2d 69 (N.Y. 
App. 2003) (civil liability when a mandated reporter "knowingly and willfully" fails to re-
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The conclusions we have just drawn apply only to the settings 
with which we began-where a social worker (or similar covered pro-
fessional) serves as an employee of or as a consultant to a law firm 
representing clients in legal matters. For our purposes, the distinction 
between a true employee of a law firm and a one-shot or occasional 
consultant to a law firm is of no matter.154 The critical element is that 
the covered professional (here, the social worker) has no separate or 
preexisting professional relationship with the client whose secrets are 
at risk. The "trump" that we perceive occurring where the lawyers' 
rules control the social worker's rules arises not because of some im-
perialistic hegemony which lawyers merit over other professionals, but 
instead simply because we understand the social worker to be operat-
ing as part of a lawyering team.1ss 
These conclusions do change, though, if the social worker does 
not clearly operate in the role of a member of the legal team. In the 
next section, we discuss, in much briefer fashion, three versions of that 
variation. 
B. The Duty of Social Workers Offering Direct Services 
For this subpart, we draw a distinction between a social worker 
serving as a member of a legal representation team, and one whose 
relationship with the lawyer's client is more ambiguous, or mul-
tifaceted. Let us separate out three scenarios. 
1. The Multi-Service Agency 
Compare the examples described earlier with the following: 
An innovative social services agency establishes a street-level office 
port). See also Singley, supra note 86. 
We opt not to pursue here the question of how, if at all, the Tarasoff doctrine might 
apply to the case of a child or elder injured after a law-firm-employed mandated reporter 
concludes that he cannot report suspected abuse or neglect, except to point out that liabil-
ity ought not apply if, in fact, the professional is forbidden to report by the application of 
the lawyers' duties. See, e.g., R. Michael Cassidy, Sharing Sacred Secrets: Is It (Past) Time 
for a Dangerous Person Exception to the Clergy Penitent Privilege?, 44 WM. & MARY L. 
REv. 1627, 1684 (2004) ("Thus far, there have been no reported cases in which the court 
has extended the Tarasoff duty to lawyers."); Divalent Cooper, The Ethical Rules Lack 
Ethics: Tort Liability When a Lawyer Fails to Warn a Third Party of a Client's Threat to 
Cause Serious Physical Harm or Death, 36 IDAHO L. REv. 479, 481 (2000). For a discus-
sion of the Tarasoff doctrine generally, see, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABIL-
ITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 41 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005); Vanessa Merton, 
Confidentiality and the "Dangerous" Patient: Implications of Tarasoff for Psychiatrists and 
Lawyers, 31 EMORY L.J. 263, 314-318 (1982); Robert F. Shop, The Psychotherapist's Duty 
to Protect the Public: The Appropriate Standard and the Foundation in Legal Theory and 
Empirical Premises, 70 NEB. L. REv. 327 (1991). 
154 See LAPD Op. E-2, supra note 119. 
155 /d. 
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which offers to its customers legal services and an array of social 
services, including mental health counseling through social workers. 
This agency, which we will call Essex County Community Multi-Ser-
vice Agency ("ECCMA"), touts its advantage in problem resolution 
by its ability to offer genuinely "holistic" care to its customers. 
Lawyers and social workers and educational specialists can work as 
a team to solve problems in ways which have a greater chance of 
long term success. ECCMA especially contrasts its offerings with 
conventional law firms, which may provide skilled legal products, 
but which may miss a client's larger picture by the blinders the legal 
training tends to produce. 
At ECCMA, persons may receive just legal services from the law-
yers, or may receive just mental health or crisis counseling from its 
social workers, or may receive a collaborative team's attention in 
situations which require the assistance of both a lawyer and a social 
worker. Thus, at times the lawyers collaborate in their work with 
social workers; at times they do not. 
The agency we have described represents a common service de-
livery model, and we can see its obvious benefits.156 The critical ques-
tion is whether a social worker employed by ECCMA would be 
required by a state mandatory reporting statute to report suspected 
information relating to abuse and neglect obtained during the social 
worker's separate counseling session, even when working with a 
lawyer. 
The first conclusion (of three we develop here) is that a social 
worker treating social work clients as a therapist within ECCMA is 
bound by his statutory duties to report abuse and neglect. The mere 
fact that EECMA contains a legal services component within its oper-
ations does not bring the social worker into the ambit of the law firm. 
Thus, if an ECCMA social worker sees a family for purposes of 
mental health counseling, and while working with that family comes to 
suspect abuse or neglect, the obligation to report would still apply. 
This is the easiest of all of the conclusions we develop. In this 
straightforward scenario, the social worker is acting directly as a social 
worker, and we see no argument which would take him out of his 
traditional role, with its standard reporting obligations. 
156 As we've described it, ECCMA resembles several existing clinics operating across 
the country. In Cambridge, Massachusetts, the Community Legal Services and Counseling 
Center ("CLSCC") offers services similar to those offered by ECCMA, and also engages in 
occasional collaborative efforts. We do not, however, intend our discussion here to refer 
directly to the practices of CLSCC, whose precise configurations may be different from the 
fictional ECCMA here. 
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2. The Interdisciplinary Collaboration 
Our next question addresses the duties of the professionals when, 
in the true spirit of ECCMA, the lawyers and the social workers func-
tion as a team to assist a client. Let us imagine the following unexcep-
tional example: 
Joan Miro, a thirty-nine-year-old mother of three adolescent chil-
dren, comes to ECCMA for help with her depression and hopeless-
ness. She is assigned to see Linda Lake:t, a social worker, who later 
refers her to the agency's lawyers for help with her claim for state 
general assistance (GA) benefits. (Joan has exhausted her lifetime 
limit of TANF welfare benefits, and so GA is the only state welfare 
program for which she might qualify.) Because the state awards 
GA benefits only to "disabled" individuals, the lawyers cooperate 
with Linda to develop evidence proving that Joan cannot maintain 
employment in the regional economy in light of her depression and 
anxiety. While working with Joan and the team, Linda learns that 
Joan's poor parenting skills likely qualify as "neglect" under the 
state statute. Unless her working relationship with the ECCMA 
lawyers changes something, she is obligated to report Joan to the 
state Department of Social Services (DSS). Given the work that the 
team is engaged in with Joan, and Joan's vulnerability, Linda be-
lieves that a report to DSS would not be in the best interest of Joan 
or of her children. 
In this story, the initial relationship between Linda, the social worker, 
and Joan is a therapeutic one, a relationship arising out of Linda's role 
as a therapist. As in the previous example,157 before Linda collabo-
rates with the ECCMA lawyers, there is no question that she remains 
a mandated reporter. The question-and it is an important one which 
will arise not infrequently-is whether the collaboration with the legal 
team changes Linda's duties. 
Our understanding here is that the collaboration does not relieve 
Linda of her duty to report Joan's neglect to DSS. The critical consid-
eration is the nature of the relationship between Linda and Joan. 
Here, that relationship is one of a social worker and her client. The 
collaboration with the lawyering team does not, and cannot, change 
that reality. We must proceed on the understandable assumption that 
the mandated reporting statute will always apply unless some super-
seding argument renders it inapplicable. In our first example, of the 
social worker/employee of the law firm, 158 we conceived the social 
worker as a member of the legal team, as a lawyer-surrogate, if you 
will (in the same manner that a paralegal or law clerk is a lawyer sur-
157 See supra Part II.B.l. 
158 See supra Part II.A. 
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rogate ). Here, that conception is not reasonably available. Linda re-
mains Joan's social worker, and the statute continues to apply to 
her.Is9 
If that conclusion is sound, the lawyers within ECCMA must ad-
just their client interactions accordingly, lest they breach a duty to 
their clients. Just as the D.C. Ethics Committee160 and several com-
mentators161 have suggested, the agency must warn its clients that 
some of what they reveal to their lawyers may not remain protected, 
but (if our earlier conclusions are sound) only those clients for whom 
the social worker is a member of the legal team.162 This warning will 
mimic the warning which the social workers will already have pro-
vided to their clients at the beginning of their work with them, as stan-
dard social worker protocol requires.163 
Note, though, an important complicating consideration for all in-
volved in a team endeavor, with social workers working side-by-side 
with lawyers on their respective client's case. The client need not only 
fear that information disclosed to the social worker risks becoming 
subject to the mandated reporting. The client must be aware that in-
formation disclosed to the lawyers also risks becoming subject to the 
social worker's mandatory reporting duties, if the lawyers allow the 
social worker to learn that information. Because of the breadth of the 
mandatory reporting schemes, which encompasses information lead-
159 Another permutation of these scenarios presents itself at this point. Might ECCMA 
offer Joan the choice of terminating her therapy relationship with Linda, with the under-
standing that Linda will then become a member of the legal team and as a result will no 
longer be subject to the mandated reporting statute, based on the earlier analysis? Con-
ceptually that proposition makes sense, if indeed Linda ceases serving as an ongoing thera-
pist and then establishes a new role as a legal consultant. Analytically, it seems to follow 
that facts she learned while serving as a therapist would be subject to the state reporting 
law; facts she learns while serving as a legal team consultant would not. Whether Linda 
would be prudent in attempting this transition of roles is a different question entirely, 
especially if she were defending, after the fact, a decision not to report some imminent 
danger to Joan's children. 
160 DC Op. 282, supra note 116, at 3. 
161 See, e.g., Brustin, supra note 9, at 847-48; Donohue, supra note 6; St. Joan, supra 
note 4, at 437-39. 
162 A prudent office offering both legal and social services will establish protocols de-
signed to ensure that clients understand these risks and the differentiation of role responsi-
bilities. While written notices or consent forms might be necessary, they may not be 
sufficient to caution clients adequately of the reporting duties of some members of the 
organization. The protocols thus may well include conversations with clients about the 
nuances of this issue. 
163 See SociAL WoRKER CoDE, supra note 11, at § 1.07(d)("Social workers should in-
form clients, to the extent possible, about the disclosure of confidential information and 
the potential consequences, when feasible before the disclosure is made. This applies 
whether social workers disclose confidential information on the basis of a legal require-
ment or client consent."). See also MAss. REGS. CoDE tit. 258 § 20.09 (2007) (same). 
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ing the social worker to "suspect" abuse or neglect, 164 a social 
worker's duties would surely be triggered by facts learned from the 
lawyers' files or the lawyers' conversations.l65 
This reality is a sobering one for the prospect of truly effective 
interdisciplinary practice.166 Consider the practical implications of the 
understanding we have arrived at. While a lawyer and a social worker 
work together to assist a client with complex psycho-social and legal 
difficulties, the lawyers must vigilantly monitor and cull what they 
share with the social worker, lest they reveal some facts which would 
trigger the mandatory reporting duties. The "team" can never truly 
collaborate, because the social worker can never know confidently 
that the lawyers have not held back certain information to protect the 
client from the social worker's obligations. We assume, although the 
answer is not entirely evident, that it is not an effective measure for 
the lawyers essentially to "toggle" each collaborative team effort with 
an ongoing classification of "redacted" and "not redacted." In other 
words, we doubt the effectiveness of a solution where the lawyers say 
to the social worker collaborator something like the following: "In 
this case we're holding back nothing, so we're truly a team until we 
tell you otherwise," or (for the others) "In this case we'll tell you up 
front that we have learned some information from our client which we 
unfortunately cannot open up to you, so our 'teamwork' will be a bit 
hobbled here-not worthless, but not ideal either."167 
164 See, e.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 17a-101a; Ward v. Greene, 839 A.2d 1259 (Conn. 
2004). 
165 While a mandated reporter's actions must be based upon reliable evidence underly-
ing the "suspicion," see, e.g., Gucci v. Conn. Dept. of Children & Fam., 2003 WL 22853895 
(Conn. Super. 2003)(overturning abuse finding in light of insufficient evidence), there 
seems no requirement that a reporter have direct, non-hearsay evidence of the underlying 
facts. See, e.g., O'Hare v. Blarney, 583 S.E.2d 834 (Ga. 2003) (finding report reasonable 
even in the absence of direct observations). Evidence in a file made available to a social 
worker would thus trigger the social worker's reporting obligations. 
166 Besides the difficulties addressed in the text, one wonders how effectively any lawyer 
can explain to a client the nuances of the possible risks of an inadvertent disclosure of the 
client's secrets. Besides the risks to the client's confidences, this difficulty creates serious 
risks for the lawyer's exposure to discipline should information be reported without a cli-
ent's knowing and informed consent. See MoDEL RULES, supra note 12, at R. 1.6(a)(client 
must give "informed consent" to disclosure of information); R. l.O(e) (defining "informed 
consent" as including communication of "adequate information and explanation about the 
material risks"). 
167 The difficulty with this "toggle" concept is apparent. Not only does the disclosure 
taint the working relationship, but the client may share some secret information after the 
"all clear" statement has been given. For a discussion of this difficulty in the context of a 
medical-legal collaborative, see Pamela Tames, Paul R. Tremblay, They Wagner, Ellen 
Lawton & Lauren Smith, Commentary: The Lawyer Is In: Why Some Doctors Are Prescrib-
ing Legal Remedies for Their Patients, and How the Legal Profession Can Support this 
Effort, 12 B.U. PuB. INT. L.J. 505, 514-15 (2003). 
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3. The Interagency Consultation 
Let us end our discussion of the mandatory reporting phenome-
non with a treatment of the last iteration we can imagine occurring in 
an agency such as ECCMA-where the agency staff social worker 
"parachutes into" the lawyering sector to assist with a case. Our con-
clusion here is that the consulting social worker, like in the very first 
examples, is best described as a member of the legal team, and the 
conclusion we first drew applies here-that is, the lawyering roles 
trump the state statute if lawyers are otherwise exempt from that 
statute. 
Let us amend our last example, involving the client Joan Miro, in 
the following way: 
In this iteration, the lawyers have agreed to represent Joan in her 
disability benefits appeal. With Joan's medical history and hospital 
records in hand, the lawyers decide to ask Linda Laker, a staff social 
worker at ECCMA, for expert assistance in understanding the na-
ture of Joan's illnesses and how her illnesses ought to affect her 
functioning. Linda agrees to join the lawyers in this role. While 
working with Joan and the team, Linda learns that Joan's poor 
parenting skills likely qualify as "neglect" under the state statute. 
Unless her working relationship with the ECCMA lawyers changes 
something, she is obligated to report Joan to the state Department 
of Social Services (DSS). Given the work that the team is engaged 
in with Joan, and Joan's vulnerability, Linda believes that a report 
to DSS would not be in the best interest of Joan or of her children. 
Once again, the question is whether this employment role for 
Linda affects in any way her otherwise existing duties to report sus-
pected abuse and neglect. Relying on our initial analysis, we analo-
gize Linda in this setting to the social worker employee of a law firm. 
The critical consideration, again, is the nature of the relationship be-
tween Joan and Linda. In the example of the interdisciplinary collab-
oration, just above, we concluded confidently that Linda was Joan's 
therapist, and so her duties remained in place, even when working 
with the lawyers. Here, by contrast, Linda has no relationship with 
Joan except as an expert consultant hired by a law firm to assist it in 
its legal representation. If our initial analysis is sound, then there is no 
principled distinction between the social worker employee and the so-
cial worker "parachuting" consultant.168 
168 It is entirely possible that the conclusion just expressed would change if Linda served 
as a testifying expert witness for Joan's case. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof') 
Responsibility, Formal Opinion 411 (1998) ("Ethical Issues in Lawyer to Lawyer Consul-
tation"); Jett Hanna, Moonlighting Law Professors: Identifying and Minimizing the Profes-
sional Liability Risk, 42 So. TEx. L. REv. 421 (2001)(expert witness is not necessarily a 
member of the hiring lawyer's legal team); Selinger, supra note 128, at 410-15 (arguing 
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C. Suggestions for Responding Ethically and Responsibly to 
Suspicions of Abuse and Neglect 
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In this final subpart we address briefly an important practical is-
sue: How the lawyer/social worker team might proceed when con-
fronting otherwise reportable evidence of abuse or neglect, even if the 
laws do not require a formal report. 
To conclude, as we have done, that social workers working in law 
firms at times are not bound by state reporting statutes answers one 
set of important questions, but leaves another set of important ques-
tions unanswered. Even if a social worker need not report evidence of 
abuse or neglect, and even if the lawyers are bound by their ethical 
obligation to maintain client confidentiality, how might a lawyer/social 
worker team respond in a responsible and ethical fashion to such evi-
dence? Do we mean to suggest that ignoring the evidence of abuse or 
neglect is a form of "best practices"? 
Our phrasing the inquiry in that fashion telegraphs its answer. A 
responsible and effective lawyer, working with a responsible and ef-
fective social worker, will not and cannot simply ignore the informa-
tion which might require an independent helping professional to file a 
report. While this issue may deserve its own separate article, we offer 
some preliminary reflections on it here. As context for our reflec-
tions, consider the following story: 
The same law school clinic team that represented Sally in her di-
vorce proceedings169 has been appointed to represent Joe, a fifteen-
year-old 9th grader who lives with his mother, step-father and ten-
year-old sister. Because of Joe's recent truancy, Joe's school filed 
what is known as a Child in Need of Services (CHINS) petition with 
the local District CourtP0 In an upcoming hearing, a Judge will 
order a service plan of sorts, recommending particular interventions 
to address the truancy. 
In the course of the team's interview with Joe he mentions that his 
step-father is an alcoholic, and when drinking he has a "bad tem-
per." Joe informs the team that his step-father has hit him on sev-
eral occasions in the past two years. These incidents have been 
escalating in frequency and intensity. The most recent incident oc-
curred four weeks ago when his step-father slapped him in the face 
against a consultant to a legal team serving as an expert witness in the same case). 
169 See supra Part Il.A.2.b. 
170 In many states, legislation authorizes school officials, parents, and others to institute 
a court action intended to deliver services to children at risk. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAws 
ch. 119 § 39E. In such proceedings, the child is the subject of the proceeding and serves in 
some respects as a "defendant," even though the proceedings are intended to help, and not 
to punish, him. In many states the child is also entitled to appointed counsel. See, e.g., id. 
at§ 39F. 
716 CLINICAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:659 
and pushed him against a wall. This was about the time Joe stopped 
going to school. Joe's mother is not aware of these incidents and 
Joe states emphatically that he does not want the team to tell any-
one about the incidents. He does not want the state's Department 
of Social Services (DSS) involved, he wants to stay at home (and 
does not want foster care or residential placement), and wants to try 
to graduate with his friends. He is also concerned that if his mother 
learns about these incidents it would create more tension between 
her and his step-father. 
The student attorney and supervising attorney feel strongly about 
representing Joe's stated interest. He wants to stay at home and 
says he will make every effort to attend school. 
If Joe told his story to a social worker therapist, the social worker 
would be required to report the step-father's violent behavior to DSS. 
When Joe tells the story instead to his lawyer team, the team has no 
such obligation. The lawyers have discretion not to disclose the vio-
lence, although the story just told possibly provides the lawyers with 
discretion to reveal the information even without Joe's consent.171 
And if the above analysis is cogent, the social worker working as part 
of the team is not obligated to disclose the violence to DSS, but shares 
the same discretionary judgments as the lawyers. 
Even if the lawyers have no discretion at all to disclose the step-
father's behaviors, they cannot act as though they never learned about 
the violence. While they may opt not to make a report, they will ac-
knowledge the difficult position in which Joe finds himself. Effective 
legal representation will include careful, thoughtful counseling of Joe 
about his needs, wants and interests, including his safety, as he lives 
with the step-father. As developed above, the lawyers in this setting 
may actually have an advantage by working with a social worker on 
their team in achieving their counseling goals.172 
What might this counseling look like? The lawyers will want to 
ensure that Joe understands that they are his allies and his confidants, 
but that they still worry about his protection. They will explore with 
him his competing needs to remain in his current home and at the 
same time not to be hurt. The lawyers may not persuade Joe that a 
report to some authority will serve his longer term interests, but they 
must be sure that Joe understands that option and its potential advan-
tages. His perceptions and his predictions may not be realistic ones-
not necessarily because he is a child, but because many clients, young 
171 See MoDEL RuLES, supra note 12, at R. 1.6(b)(l) (lawyer may disclose "to prevent 
reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm"). The judgment calls revolve around 
predicting whether the previous violence makes it "reasonably certain" that Joe will be hit, 
and whether the violence constitutes substantial bodily harm. 
172 See supra text accompanying notes 70-75. 
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and old, can benefit from a more objective viewpoint. This is simply 
good legal counseling. 
The lawyers may hope that Joe will give them permission to inter-
vene to protect him against the step-father (while they simultaneously 
hope that some intervention will actually lead to his protection).173 
But, unless their worry about his well-being is immediate and desper-
ate, we might assume that the lawyers will not betray Joe's wishes 
about confidentiality, and will not disclose the violence to any other 
person.174 That result may be more comfortable for the lawyers to 
accept than for the social worker, who has been trained differently 
and who sees his role as more paternalistic. If the lawyers opt not to 
exercise discretion and report the violence (or if the lawyers have no 
such discretion in their judgment), the team members need to engage 
in a soul-searching conversation about their respective roles and the 
lawyers' reasons for so acting. The social worker may come to agree 
that the lawyers have made the best decision possible under the cir-
cumstances. The lawyers may come to conclude that their decision is 
in fact not justified. Or the two professionals may agree to disagree, 
respecting the role differences between the professions. If this process 
works well, the lawyers will understand better the implications of their 
role obligations, and the social worker will feel heard and respected in 
the process. 
CONCLUSION 
Our musings have served to cement our respect for and delight 
with interdisciplinary collaboration. This survey of certain key ethical 
mandates has confirmed that lawyers and social workers can satisfy 
their respective professional duties in several of the critical areas 
viewed by many as suspect: mandated reporting, zealous advocacy, 
and client autonomy. Thanks to an interdisciplinary team's comple-
mentary professional orientations and trainings, the legal counseling 
will be richer and more comprehensive, while the representation re-
173 We include this parenthetical simply as a reminder of the blunt fact that reporting 
dangerous situations to authorities like DSS will not assuredly change Joe's life for the 
better. Joe's embeddings in his relationships with his mother, step-father, school friends, 
and the like means that any changes in his life conditions, while well meant, may have 
many unintended reactions. 
174 The assertion in the text may require a more extended explanation. We approach 
Joe's counseling with an understanding that ethical lawyers tend toward the anti-paternal-
ism stance-that arguments suggesting betrayal of a client's wishes carry with them a heavy 
burden of proof. See, e.g., BINDER, BERGMAN, PRICE & TREMBLAY, supra note 2, at 4-8, 
379-97; Kruse, supra note 23, at 426-440. The operating presumption against acting against 
a client's stated wishes is hardly irrebuttable, of course. If the lawyers fear for Joe's safety 
in a palpable and urgent way, we trust that they will seek outside intervention even if their 
client refuses to authorize them to do so. 
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mains steadfastly zealous, rather than fatally hobbled. 
We hesitate to predict whether all ethical dilemmas which may 
arise in interdisciplinary practice are similarly capable of satisfactory 
resolution. What for example of the statutory and ethical bars against 
unauthorized practice of law? What of the ethical and moral barriers 
against deceiving third parties? Further investigation lies ahead. 
While we do not prejudge those debates, we do embrace their explo-
ration to ensure that interdisciplinary collaboration can flourish. 
